Questions
for the Record Submitted
to
Ambassador-Designate John R Bolton by
Senator Joseph Biden (#1)
Committee on Foreign Relations
April 11, 2005
Question:
In questions for the record
submitted after the hearing, I asked whether you or a staff member acting on
you behalf had ever "ask[ed] the Legal Adviser or one of his deputies in L to
rotate, remove, replace, or change the duties or assignment of an attorney or
attorneys working on a matter relevant to your areas of responsibility, or take
any other action with regard to the attorney or attorneys, so that the attorney
or attorneys were no longer assigned to duties relevant to your areas of
responsibility?" You did not provide a direct response to the question. Please
do so.
Answer:
I answered the question as best I
understood it.
Questions for the Record
Submitted to
Ambassador-Designate John R. Bolton
by
Sen. Joseph Biden (#2)
Committee on Foreign Relations
April 11, 2005
Question:
Did you ask Mr. Fleitz or anyone else on
your staff to call officials at the Central Intelligence Agency or the National
Intelligence Council to seek the removal of "Mr. Smith" or urge that lie
be given a different portfolio? Please elaborate.
Answer:
No.
style="mso-spacerun: yes">
Questions for the Record Submitted to
style="mso-spacerun: yes">
Ambassadors-Designate John R. Bolton by
style="mso-spacerun: yes">
Sen. Joseph Biden (#3)
style="mso-spacerun: yes">
Committee on Foreign Relations
style="mso-spacerun:
yes"> April 11,
2005
Question:
In the questions for the record
submitted after the hearing, in the first set, the answer to #5'b (related to
the handling of classified materials) is unresponsive. Please answer both
questions.
Answer:
As I said in my
original answer to this question, all classified material that requires special
handling is logged in under State Department procedures. As INK Assistant
Secretary Thomas Fingar told the SFRC staff during their interview of him:
'There was a problem, not unique to the T family, that getting CIA to comply
with ---- not just their own directives, but the 'no 'waivers, no exception'
requirement to the DSCIDs that was imposed on the Department of State -- that
they simply couldn't be leaving these documents anyplace that they chose to
leave them. It's a problem that recurs to this day. So, the phenomenon, I'm
delighted they were attentive to it, the officers in the T family
bureaus who called them to our attention and get them under control were doing
exactly the right thing. You educate people, and eventually, they climb the
learning curve, and they get it. And you have rotations, and you start the
process again"
I believe I answered
this question to the best of my ability. Other than the minor issues Mr.
Fingar describes above and the misunderstanding described in question #5a of
the questions Senator Biden submitted to me after my hearing which I fully
answered, I have nothing further to add.
UNCLASSIFIED
Questions for the Record
Submitted to
Ambassador-Designate John
R. Bolton by
Senator Joseph Biden (#4)
Committee on Foreign
Relations
April 11, 2005
Question:
In response to the question for the
record regarding negative security assurances ("other issues," question #3) you
stated:
"I said, in that
published interview with Arms Control Today, that the approach reflected by the
1995 declaration on negative security assurance is one that the
Administration does not find as the most productive in analyzing our security
needs in today's world. As the transcript makes clear, I did not say the
negative security assurance policy should be discarded."
The transcript of your February 2002
Arms Control Today interview is available at href="http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/boltonmarch02.asp">http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/boltonmarch02.asp.
In response to questions on negative security assurances, you said:
I don't think we are of the view that
this kind of approach is necessarily the most productive. What we've tried to
say is that we're looking at changing the overall way we view strategic issues,
and a large part of that is embodied in the outcome of the nuclear posture
review. It's certainly reflected in the ongoing strategic discussions that
we've had with the Russians and reflected in the discussions we've had with a
number of other countries as well. So, I just don't think that our emphasis is
on the rhetorical. Our emphasis is on the actual change in our military
posture.
I don't think we have any intention of
using nuclear weapons in circumstances that I can foresee in the days ahead of
us. The point is that the kind of rhetorical approach that you are describing
doesn't seem to me to be terribly helpful in analyzing what our security needs
may be in the real world, and what we are doing instead of chitchatting is
making changes in our force structures, that we're making in a very transparent
fashion. We've briefed the Russians, friends, and allies as well about the
nuclear posture review, and we'll let our actions speak.
style="mso-spacerun: yes"> We take our obligations under the
NPT very seriously. In terms of what was said at the 1995 and 2000 NPT
review conferences, we're reviewing all of that in the context of
our preparation for the 2005 NFT Review conference. And I think
those statements, as I said before, were made in a very
different geostrategic context, so I think it's important for us to review them
looking toward the 2005 review conference
Shortly after given the Arms Control
Today interview, you were quoted on February 22, 2002, in the
Washington Times as saying, "We would have to do what is appropriate under
the circumstances and the classic formulation of that is, we are not
ruling anything in and we are not ruling anything out.... We are
just not into theoretical assertions that other administrations
have made." That article went on to cite you as saying that such
promises reflect "an unrealistic view of the international
situation... The idea that fine theories of deterrence work against everybody,
which is implicit in the negative security assurances, has just
been disproven by September 11."
In light of these statements:
a. Was it your
view, at the time of the Arms Control Today interview that negative security
assurances should be retained?
b.style='mso-tab-count:1'> What is your current stand regarding
negative security assurances?
c. Do you
recommend that the United States, at the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty
Review Conference in New York next month, reaffirm the negative security
assurances that it has given in the past? If not, what
alternative assurances do you recommend?
Answer
As I expressed my view publicly on negative security assurances at
some length in early 2002. The Administration did not then nor has it
since conducted a formal review of U.S. negative security assurance
policy. Under these circumstances, I did not have an opportunity to recommend a
future course on negative security assurances and do not believe it is
appropriate now for me to speculate on what I might have recommended at the
time.
B. My views about
the potential benefits of these rhetorical approaches have not changed.
U.S. policy on negative security assurances has not changed. I support
U.S. policy.
C. If confirmed as U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, I would no longer have any
direct role in the formulation of U.S. nonproliferation policy. At this point I
will not venture a recommendation on what approach the United States should
take on negative security assurances at the NPT Review Conference, which is now
underway.
UNCLASSIFIED
Questions for the Record
Submitted to
Ambassador-Designate
John R. Bolton by
Sen. Joseph Biden (#5)
Committee on Foreign
Relations
April 11, 2005
Question:
Your response to question 8b ("other
issues"), related to North Korea and nuclear weapons, is unresponsive. Please
answer it.
For clarification, that question was:
8. In
1999, you wrote that those who called the Agreed Framework with North Korea
"serial bribery" and appeasement... correctly characterize the course of
American policy toward the North over the last six years," You called
for "firmness" instead, adding: "it is unconscionable that the White House is
unable to muster even a modicum of resoluteness to contain, let alone roll
back, the North Korean threat"
b) Did the North Korean
threat roll back after you got tough with them, when they took the spent fuel
that had been stored and monitored under the Agreed Framework and made enough
plutonium for another half dozen nuclear weapons?
Answer:
I answered the question to the best of
my ability.
Questions for the
Record Submitted to
Ambassador-Designate
John R. Bolton by
Senator Joseph Biden
(#6)
Committee on Foreign
Relations
April 11, 2005
Question:
Your response to question 9c
("other issues"), seeking the clearance page on your speech in Seoul on July
31,2003, is unresponsive, Please provide the clearance page.
For Clarification purposes, question 9c ("other issues") was...
On July 31, 2003, you delivered a
speech in South Korea in which you singled out North Korean leader Kim Jong-il
for ridicule, naming him some 40 times as a dictator and rejecting what you
called "His extortionist demands." I don't question these specific assertions,
but I wonder about the timing of the speech and the repetition of the term.
c) Please
provide the clearance page for the speech, as delivered in Seoul, from the
Department of State.
Answer
We did not prepare a formal clearance page for the speech However,
if we had prepared one, it would reflect the clearance of all relevant offices
within the Department of State, as well as by National Security Council staff,
Department of Defense staff and the Office of the Vice President. As was noted
by Secretary Powell in his letter to Senator Kyl, provided to the Committee in
my previous response, the speech was fully cleared and reflected Administration
policy.
style="mso-spacerun: yes"> Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador-Designate
John R. Bolton by
style="mso-spacerun: yes"> Sen. Joseph Biden (#7)
style="mso-spacerun: yes"> Committee on Foreign Relations
style="mso-spacerun: yes"> April 11, 2005
Question:
You did not respond to question 9f ("other issues"). Please do so.
For clarification, that question was:
On July 31,2003, you delivered a speech
in South Korea in winch you singled out North Korean leader Kim Jong-il for
ridicule, naming him some 40 times as a dictator and rejecting what you called
"his extortionist demands." I don't question these specific assertions, but I
wonder about the timing of the speech and the repetition of the term...
1) Were
you ever asked by Secretary Powell to refrain from making public comments about
the North Korea nuclear issue?
Answer:
I do not recall any such conversation. As I indicated in my
previous answer:
"As is always the case, we carefully
coordinated both our public pronouncements and private discussions in the
pursuit of the President's goal of seeking a peaceful means to achieving the
complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear programs in
the DPRK."
Questions for
the Record Submitted to
Ambassador-Designate
John R. Bolton by
Senator Joseph Biden (#8)
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
April 11, 2005
Question:
You did not respond to question 10a
("other issues") or the second question in 10c, relating to NSC official
Michael Green's trip to East Asia in January 2005. Please respond to them.
Answer
The presentation given by NSC Staff was fully cleared by the
Intelligence Community and all relevant policy agencies. As part of this
process, a Special Assistant in my office cleared these points.
Other participants in the Six Party Talks have expressed their
appreciation for receiving this information. We are not aware of any concerns
about the accuracy of the information from the countries we have briefed on
this issue.
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