PART TWO OF TRANSCRIPT OF RATHER INTERVIEW WITH HANS BLIX

In an exclusive interview from Cypress, CBS News' Dan Rather questioned the UN's top weapons inspector Hans Blix and IAEA Director Mohammad El-Baradei about their thoughts on Iraq's latest delaying tactic for inspections. A portion of the interview was broadcast the CBS Evening News.

The following is Part Two of the full-text transcript of Rather's interview with Blix and El-Baradei:

(DR) We've talked about this new discovery concerning potential nuclear experimentation and research, your inspectors found 11 122-millimeter rocket warheads. Was there any residue of chemical weapons agents found on any of these rocket warheads?

(HB) No, there was one on which they weren't quite sure whether there was any residue and I think they have now checked that and they have so far at any rate not found any trace of it. So the apparent conclusion is that these were intended to be filled but had not been filled and that they had been there since the end of the 90s.

(DR) Are you concerned that Saddam Hussein may say enough already of these inspectors and ask you to leave?

(HB) It is possible that it could happen but I think it would be very serious consequences for Iraq if they did so. Of course if they concluded that war is coming tomorrow then they might do so, inspectors will not stay during the warfare.

(DR) Let me ask you the opposite of that question. Are you concerned that President Bush and the Americans will say enough already we suggest that you leave for your own safety?

(ME) I am concerned that if we are not able to report, to inch forward then, I'm concerned that if we're not making progress but that not only the SU but other countries will just become impatient and say well, why should we give more time for the inspectors. They are not producing results let us use other means. So, we need again, we need to, the Iraqis to help us help them basically, and that's, again, that's the message. That the time is not indefinite, that every day goes by there is more calls for, you know, shifting gear into different methods and unless we are able to start reporting progress, progress meaning Iraqi pro-active approach, Iraqis transparency, we cannot guarantee that we'll continue to have an open mandate.

(HB) And I'm sure that nevertheless that the more places we visit, the more sites we go to in Iraq, the more there is a deterrent for them to use big industries for the production of weapons. To have a hundred percent certainty is very hard. I think the shortcoming or the limitations upon them, the method of using inspections, is that there could be things underground, there could be things mobile that's been reported and of course, the inspectors could be thrown out one day. But as long as inspectors are there, and we are fanning out all over the country, we visited some 300 site now, major industries, there is a deterrent and there is greater transparency. Not a complete one but the is nevertheless a deterrent.

(DR) MR. Blix, may I ask you a question that I suspect, that many people, not just in America but elsewhere are asking, that you've said that the Iraqis are not giving you the evidence that you need. You've said that they imported missiles that were in violation of the UN sanctions. Your inspectors found 11 warheads that could be used for chemical and biological weapons and now in these documents, your inspectors have found some evidence that raises questions about possible, possible nuclear research. How much more do you need?

(HB) Well as we said, the document is about a laser production. The IAEA was perfectly aware of that the laser production took place before the 1990 and is doesn't add very much to that knowledge. What it teaches is that they are not declaring meticulously what they should have been declaring. I should also correct that you suggested that we had found missiles, well we haven't found missiles, we've found the shells that were intended for chemical weapons. We have however taken note of the fact that they have imported engines for, for missiles. And this import has taken place in violation of the UN ban, as late as 1999 and the year 2000. These engines were originally at least intended for a missile that was not prescribed, not prohibited, the SA2. But there is a good question whether they could also be used for, for missiles that go beyond the permitted range and we are looking at that at the present time.

(ME) Dan, I would add that our very presence there provide a very strong deterrence for Iraq to start any large scale weapon of mass destruction program, so we are if you like freezing the activities there. What we are really after is activities that we haven't seen in the past. We still have not seen a smoking gun to say let us throw the towel. But we still have large degree of uncertainty and we think that if, hopefully, if Iraq were to cooperate, we would like to reduce that uncertainty to an acceptable level. If that will take us few months more and if we, in the process disarm Iraq2 through an inspection and avoid a war, in my view that is time very well spent.

(DR) Mr. Blix, let me follow up on that and have you respond. He's mentioned a few months more. Is there or is there not any conflict between what you say you need in terms of time and the apparent US military timetable? Is there a conflict there?

(HB) Well, I'm not privy to the US military timetable. But we hear that they, if they were to undertake an armed action it should be during the period is not too hot. But of course we operate under the timetable given to us by the security counsel and so long as the security counsel asks us to continue with the work, we will do so.

(ME) I think we are aware, Dan of course, of all the military preparation. But we are not, we are not influenced by that you know. We, we have to continue to do our work as required by the security counsel but we are not naïve not to understand that there are degree of impatience and I think we are conveying that degree that impatience to the Iraqis. I hope the Iraqis also understand the impatience. We are not masters of the timeline but we will try our best to avoid a war. I still believe that war is not necessarily inevitable, is not the best option, but, and if we can avoid it in any way we can I think that would be a good option.

(HB) I don't think anyone has said that war is inevitable. You do not hear that from Secretary of State Collin, nor from President Bush, nor from Prime Minister Blair. They all say that yes, the Iraqis, if they come to a positive cooperation, that they hope that they can avoid that solution.

(DR) To ask you, today there were complaints from one of the scientists whose home was entered. He said, has been quoted saying that one of the UN inspectors behaved in, this is a direct quote, "mafia style" and mentioned specifically that in his opinion, the scientist said that his wife's illness, there was an attempt to use that as a way to get him out of the country for questioning. Is there any truth to that?

(ME) Well, we heard that just today Dan. I think that we are going to investigate that when we go tomorrow to Baghdad. Obviously if that were, did happen, that's not an acceptable behavior and we obviously do not condone that anybody would use his wife illness to ask him to go out. If we want the scientist to go out, we'll go directly to the scientist and ask him for interview outside the country. But I cannot really confirm or deny because we need to speak to the people in Baghdad and find out the story. I doubt it though that our people who are professional in both organizations will try to use his wife illness to try to lure him out of the country and if that were to happen obviously that person will be reprimanded clearly.

(DR) The Iraqis have said that they can't guarantee the safety of the U2 over-flights that you say that you would like to have and that you need. In your opinion is this a legitimate concern on their part of is he just being obstinate. After all, Iraqis surely can find the difference between a slow flying plane at 70 feet and a fast flying warplane at 20 thousand?

(HB) Well its quite a recent matter that's come up in this past week and I expect to talk to them about this. It is true that we have requested to have the U2 and the United States has been ready to send it and UNSCOM, the preceding organization that used U2 flights, quite a lot, we were ready to resume that. I trust that eventually they will accept that we will have them because the SU flies there anyways so if we have one flight that is dedicated and exclusively dedicated to the UN I do not see that issue really pose any addition security problems for the Iraqis.

(DR) Is it worth, considering the inspection process under the current conditions that the Iraqis are operating, they don't try to stop you but they don't try to help you?

(ME) Well, I think that if we continue in that way then, and for quite a while afterwards and if we are not making progress then obviously one will question the value for the inspection but I must say we have at least in the nuclear area, we have been making progress, I'm not saying that this last 8 weeks were spend in vain. We systematically went after all reports in the Mr. Blair dossier, in the US dossier about new buildings that were constructed in the last 4 years. Systematically made sure that they were not used in connection with weapons programs. We are very much investigating the importation of aluminum tube, which was a major accusation that they might be reviving an enrichment program. I think we are making good progress that this were dedicated to conventional rocket, we have not yet concluded on that but we're making good progress. We're following leads on question of importation of uranium from Niger, Africa. So we're making good progress but we cold have made much faster progress if Iraq would is cooperating. I'm not saying that without Iraq's full cooperation we're not, we cannot establish the fact but we're saying that with Iraq cooperation we can make it much faster and get a much better assurance and in the case of Iraq I think that as Hans said, the international community expects a high level of assurance, I mean the pattern of behavior of Iraq since the 90s have created an environment where by the international community is saying enough, reasonable assurance is not enough. We need high level of assurance before we can say Iraq has disarmed.

(HB) we were both at the International Atomic Energy Agency, where the South African government decided that they would do away with their nuclear weapons and its interesting to compare the attitude that we saw there and those that we have been encountered in Iraq.

South Africa said look, here are the places that we think you should go to and they indicated a lot of places, and then they said if you want to go anywhere else just tell us and we'll take you there, military civilians, we'll take you there. And they gave us a lot of documentation, and said well, we think you should read all this. And if there is anything else you're looking for just tell us,. It was, they used the inspection as an opportunity to demonstrate and to convince to the world that they had done away with their nuclear weapons. We never said that we have 100% assurance, there will always be a little residue of uncertainly and we want to be exact we don't want to say more than we have. We want to be fair so we didn't go that far but nevertheless they were (in front) of the security council, everybody accepted this, this attitude was one that was taken as bonfire.

(DR) And you're contrasting that with the current Iraqi attitude?

HB: Yes which is more, it's not, I mean they do a lot of passive cooperation as Mohamed says. But it is not that proactive. It needs to be more convincing than it has been.

ME: I can give you one example Dan, for example, lately they have been saying that an inspecting organization are a bunch of spies. That's not helpful. That's not an environment in which you work. We told them when were in Baghdad if you have any specific complaints, come to us and we are not going to tolerate any spying, any people that are working for countries, or any source other than UN organization. But just to say these are spies, rather than say, this is an opportunity for us to show the world through an inspecting organization that we are key... that is the kind of frame of mind we are talking about. That's what we are really tomorrow going to say you guys, you need to level with us, this is not the way we are going to be able
to provide the assurances expected by the Security Council, if we are not able to provide assurances requested by the Security Council, consequences are not very good.

(HB) I can understand that Iraq which is fearing an armed action against them that they wouldn't like any spies, any inspectors that would go to their military establishments, a report may be to a country, that I understand. But we have set up a system both in the IA and the UNMOVIC that is very clean. We do not, we welcome intelligence from member states, and it's asked for in the resolutions, and we do get that, and it's helpful, but it is a one way traffic. We are not giving them back any intelligence, we are not spies.

(DR) let me set aside for the moment the Iraqi allegations that you're shot through with spies. Are you or are not concerned about a world perception that you have become too, sort of, American, political in military policy?

(HB) No, we are not politicized. We are the first to say that we are servants of the Security Council, and sometimes ask, do you have in your hands the question of war and peace in Iraq? We say no. It is the Iraq in the first place, how they behave, and second place is the Security Council and the members of the Security Council who decide we have an important role.

We are not unaware of our responsibility. But it primarily one to be diligent in inspections and to be absolutely honest and balanced in our judgment and reporting to the Council.

(ME) I think, Dan, it's no secret that, both of us try to very much.. and sometimes it's not easy to keep our independence, our objectivity, and that's a lot of pressure, not from many different quarters, but even during the formulation of the security council resolution 1441, We were I think, you know, instrumental, modestly apart, in making sure that the resolution is a balanced, is a resolution which keeps the character of the operation as a UN operation. And I think we try our best at being aware of all the different point of views, at the end of the day, to make our judgment, and make our judgment based on clear mandate we have, and the mandate is from
the Security Council and not from any one individual member state.

(DR) You've been very patient with us and generous with your time, and I appreciate it. I want to check under the heading of being an accurate reporter. Would it be accurate for tomorrow's headlines to read something along the lines of: UN inspectors tell Iraq 'you are not doing enough, you are not doing nearly enough'. Would that be one accurate headline?

(HB) Yes. I think so.

(DR) Another potential headline would be, 'inspectors find indications of possible research for nuclear weapon'?

(HB) No

(ME) No

(ME) I would say, 'inspectors find indication that Iraq has not been fully transparent as it claimed it was'

(HB) About the past

(ME) About the past

(DR) You spoke of needing more time. You spoke of a couple of months, I think you said. Why would president Bush agree to additional time particularly given today's discovery?

(ME) Because today's discovery, as I said, is just simply an indication that Iraq has not been 100 percent transparent. Is there still hope that Iraq will become fully transparent? I hope so. At least let us try. War is always there, Dan. It's an option we always have, it is not going to go away. But a possibility of a peaceful solution is not there all the time. My point is let us try, let us use that peaceful option. Let us run its natural course. If it doesn't, let us think of other alternatives. But at least let us run its natural course. And let us not cut the process in midcourse.

(HB) We could say that.. we have said that if we were to find evidence of a weapon of mass destruction in Iraq today, or if we were stopped, denied access somewhere, we would immediately report to the Security Council.

We have not run to the Security Council to report about these vis a vis, ammunition, empty ammunition, nor have we reported on the documents. These are failures of Iraq to fulfill completely as they should their obligation, but they are not the smoking gun, they are not weapons of mass destruction.

(DR) Not a smoking gun. A smoldering gun?

(HB) Well, it's a little smoke coming up, but it is certainly not a very big affair.

(ME) It creates suspicion in our mind, Dan that there are still things that need.. that we need to see. And that requires that we do more work, we intensify our operation, and we are, and we level with the Iraqis that this is not sufficient. That you need in the next few weeks to come forward with as much evidence to enable us to understand, or to get convinced that you are in fact ready to disarm. That message is not yet, we do not see that message coming.

(DR) You say in the next few weeks. If they don't come forward in the next few weeks, what happens?

(HB) I think the political judgment is going to be an important one, but we are not in exactly the same situation because the nuclear has come so much further in the exploration that we have done on the chemical and biological, and the missiles. And I will say that if the Iraqi were to really shift gear as Mohammed says, then, and cooperated in, fully, and sincerely, and in bona fide way, well then not much time would be needed. On the other hand if they were to continue with half hearted cooperation, with resuming cat and mouse, well then I do not see much prospect, it's likely the UNSCOM started in 91 and continued to 1998. So I agree with him, I
think we need signs of a better cooperation, and the same applies to the Security Council, they also want it.

(DR) You need those signs in a matter of days or weeks?

(HB) Well, we report on this to the Security Council what happens and does. And they reach the political decision, and the members of the council will do that.

(ME) I'd like to see a prompt response when we go there, Dan. I'd like to see again, a clear change of course on the part of the Iraqis. As Hans is saying, we might not, might not reach the finishing line at the same time, his file is much more complicated. He was left with many open questions. But at least if we make, good progress on the nuclear file, that's an assurance in itself that Iraq is cooperating. But to be stalled with regard to all the four files is not very reassuring. And that's something again, I hope we will be able to reverse in the next few days, weeks, at the most

(DR) I'm sure you are aware of the saying in American legal circles, for that matter, I think in international law, that 'justice delayed is justice denied'. And for those who would say, we've already had justice delayed one time after another in Iraq, and to delay any further is to deny justice.

HB: Well we can also talk about containment. The containment of the Soviet Union, the Communists was something that took quite a long time, justice or no justice apart. And in Iraq the Gulf War was in 1991 so a long time they had been contained in an uneasy manner. I think it is for the government to decide how long do they want to go on with that.

ME: We're both lawyers Dan and so are you.

DR: I'm a journalist...

ME: But we used to be lawyers. I think what we're saying is also not...I wouldn't say that justice is delayed. I would say justice is done but not completely. I mean Iraq has been subject to sanction for 11 years. Iraq has been subject to a containment policy for at least since the Gulf War. So there is good deal of justice done but it's not yet done the way the International community would like to see it.

DR: Again, you've been very patient. What's the most important thing that the American people need to know about this situation given the new discovery and these documents?

HB: I think they need to be aware that the inspections have geared up quite a lot. We have only been there about 7 weeks. And we think we have accelerated very much in that period we're up to well over 100 inspectors now and support staff. We have 8 helicopters in Iraq. We have been to about 300 sites and we are fanning out all over the country in the future. So this is pretty good control of what is going on in the surface. Not a full control and they are certainly not giving us all the evidence about the future and it's not enough to give confidence, no. But it is something on the way.

ME: I would say in short Dan, give peace a chance. If it doesn't work then we will be the first to tell them.

DR: And to those who say, listen, we've given peace a chance again and again and again and the time is now to go to the sword.

ME: Well I'm not sure that's accurate because we have been out 4 years from Iraq. We only came back 8 weeks ago from '91 to '98 we've managed to neutralize completely the Iraqi nuclear program. In the chemical and biological and missile, and Hans can say, I mean tremendous work has been done. And so it is not that we haven't been successful, we haven't been effective. The problem that our work has been interrupted for 4 years. We've just been back for 8 weeks. What we are saying, little bit more time is needed before we can come to a conclusion. If it is not working, we will be the first to report that we are not able to succeed.

DR: And a little bit more time would be about what?

ME: Would be about in my case, I think and also in Hans' case, I think about a few months, but again it very much depend on Iraq cooperation. If we are consistently reporting Iraq cooperation, if we are close to the goal post then I think we will get the support. But if we continue to report stalling, then obviously the time is not going to be given to us. And I think we understand that and I think the Iraqis should understand that.

HB: Remember that UNSCOM destroyed more weapons of mass destruction than were destroyed during the Gulf War so disarmament through inspection is something that has paid off. But we want to get further than that. The world wants to have confidence and we are not there yet.

DR: I have one last question. Again I appreciate your patience. To those who say in the United States and elsewhere here is a classic situation, the United Nations has managed to gum up works. It's been kind of molasses with sand in a process. And that this in the end is not beneficial to world peace, you would say what?

HB: Well containment was also something that required a lot of patience and I think one must be aware that the two operations, the two ways of reaching disarmament are radically different. We are talking about inspection that we are responsible for, we're talking about 250 men or 300 men. It costs about 60-80 million dollars a year. It just doesn't give an absolute assurance. If you go for an armed action, it may be a cleaner solution. And the cost may also be vastly different. We're talking 250,000 men, you talk about 100 billion dollars a year, you talk about people injured, a destruction of the country, etc... I'm sure that those who are responsible will be aware of the very radical difference between the two options.

ME: But Dan, making peace is much more difficult than making war. Take the Middle East, there were 4 or 5 foes, did it achieve the results? Take the Korean situation today. I mean everybody agrees that war would be the worst option, and that it will take time, but that the aim is to achieve a diplomatic solution. And I think Iraq is no different. We should again try to find a peaceful resolution if we cannot work it through then we will think of other alternatives, but I'm not sure that war in many situations is a solution. Even after a war you have to go back and find a diplomatic solution. You have to go back to sit at the negotiation and work out some durable agreement. It takes time. I know the American psyche. People would like to see us get quick results. We also are very keen to get quick results but sometimes we have to understand that problems are complex, difficult, and time is required, but if you achieve results through peaceful means. If you spare innocent life, you spare human resources, you spare financial resources, and you create a better world, this is a good example. I think if we succeed in Iraq it would set a very good precedent. If we fail, I worry about the whole international arms control regime. If we fail in Iraq with all the power we have, what do we say with the rest of the world? How could we be saying that there is any assurance that we are able to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction? Iraq is a very important lesson and that's why I'm saying we should do every possible way within our means to make it succeed. We might not succeed, but we must try.