CIA Boss Defends Iraq Intel

Intelligence analysts were not told "what to say or how to say it" about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, the head of the CIA said Thursday in a speech defending his agency's estimates of Iraq's military capabilities.

George Tenet told an audience at his alma mater Georgetown University that uncertainty was a regular risk of the intelligence business. "When the facts of Iraq are all in, we will neither be completely right nor completely wrong," Tenet said.

He said the current debate over apparent intelligence shortfalls lacked context, and warned that, "politicized, haphazard evaluation without the benefit of time may result in an intelligence community that is damaged and a country that is at risk."

Tenet's speech came one year to the day after he sat behind Secretary of State Colin Powell, as Powell laid out the U.S. case for war to the United Nations — a case that is now under scrutiny.

At least five inquiries into the U.S. intelligence on Iraq are under way, and President Bush was expected to announce another commission this week to review the intelligence community.

Referring to the key October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, Tenet said intelligence analysts had concluded that in some cases Iraq had illegal weapons, and in others it was trying to build them. He said analysts differed on important aspects of these programs, but that disagreement was reported in the estimate.

"They never said there was an imminent threat," Tenet said. "Rather, they painted an objective assessment for our policymakers of a brutal dictator" intent of developing illegal weapons.

Tenet spoke a week after the former head of the Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, told Congress that prewar assessments on Iraq appeared flawed. No weapons have been found.

Appearing later Thursday morning in Charleston, S.C., Mr. Bush defended the war.

"Knowing what I knew then and knowing what I know today, America did the right thing in Iraq," Mr. Bush said.

In his speech Thursday, Tenet claimed that the weapons search so far has substantiated U.S. charges that Iraq was bolstering its missile program in violation of United Nations restrictions.

Tenet said "the jury was still out" on whether Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle to conduct surveillance or to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

"We may have overestimated the progress Saddam was making" on nuclear weapons, Tenet said.

While there were signs of illicit facilities for biological weapons work, there was no clear evidence Iraq had begun producing biological weapons or possessed stockpiles, Tenet said. He also noted contradictions among human sources on Iraq's alleged mobile biological weapons labs.

On chemical weapons, Tenet said Saddam had built dual use capabilities and had "the intent and capacity to quickly convert civilian industry to chemical weapons production."

"However, we have not found the weapons," Tenet said.

At the outset of his speech, repeating a standard Bush administration line, Tenet said the search for weapons was still under way and "not near 85 percent finished."

As to why the weapons have not been found, Tenet cited "systematic" destruction of Iraqi files and intimidation of scientists. Tenet said the weapons hunt required patience because in the aftermath of the Gulf War, it took years to uncover Iraq's WMD programs.

That history of Iraqi deception and stalling was a major factor in the CIA's prewar assessment, Tenet said. So was Iraq's failure to account for potential weapons material.

Human sources became important after U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998. In the fall of 2002, Tenet said, a human source close to Saddam told the agency that Iraq was actively working on weapons, was ready to use some banned arms it already possessed and was confident of fooling U.N. inspectors who reentered Iraq in late 2002.

"It solidified and reinforced the judgments we had reached," Tenet said. Given all the signals from Iraq, "it would have been difficult for analysts to come to any different conclusions" than the ones reported.

Nonetheless, Tenet said the CIA was reviewing its procedures and had already made changes. He said that while there were "multiple strands of reporting" on Iraq, "We did not have enough of our own human intelligence."

Saying he welcomed the proposed presidential commission on intelligence, Tenet pointed to several recent intelligence successes: the captures of al Qaeda operative Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Asian terrorist Hambali, using spy data to pressure Libya to give up its weapons of mass destruction, and helping to identify a top Pakistani scientist who sold nuclear technology to enemy states.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld echoed Tenet's theme at a Senate hearing Wednesday. "The reality is we have had some wonderful successes, and some of them not public," Rumsfeld said. "The failures are very visible, and that's always the case."

Rumsfeld also denied assertions by Democrats that Bush administration officials manipulated intelligence to push for war.

However, comparisons of CIA reporting to administration officials' statements reveal differences.

For example, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq reveals doubts by some intelligence agencies about the extent of its nuclear program, the purpose of work its on unmanned aircraft, its doctrine for using WMD and the circumstances under which Saddam Hussein might partner with al Qaeda.

Administration officials rarely, if ever, hinted at those doubts.

Tenet's agency is embroiled in controversies besides the dispute over Iraq's weapons.

The Justice Department is investigating the possible illegal leaking of a CIA operative's name to the press. And an independent commission is studying the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks — a probe that may document intelligence failures.

A holdover from the Clinton administration who has been in his post since July 1997, Tenet is already the third-longest serving director of central intelligence. Only the terms of Allen Dulles (1953-61) and Richard Helms (1966-73) exceed Tenet's tenure.