A sharply divided Florida Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled that a man didn't automatically give up paternal rights when he provided sperm to a couple for at-home artificial insemination.

The 4-3 decision said a 1993 state law about sperm donors relinquishing rights was designed to address situations involving the use of assisted reproductive technology, such as in vitro fertilization.

But dissenting justices said the law also applies to other sperm donors and raised the specter that the majority's decision could lead to children having three parents.

The ruling, in a Hillsborough County case, stemmed from Angel Rivera providing sperm to Ashley Brito and Jennifer Salas, with Brito then using an at-home kit to become pregnant. Brito and Salas subsequently got married, with the child's birth certificate showing Brito and Salas as the parents.

After couple divorced, man filed petition to be recognized as child's legal father

Brito and Salas raised the child together for a little more than a year before separating, according to Tuesday's majority opinion written by Justice Jamie Grosshans. After that, Rivera filed a petition in circuit court seeking to be recognized as the child's legal father.

A circuit judge and the 2nd District Court of Appeal ruled against Rivera, citing the 1993 law about sperm donors relinquishing rights.

Tuesday's majority opinion stopped short of saying Rivera should have paternal rights because he would need to meet other legal requirements. But it said he didn't automatically relinquish the rights when he provided the sperm.

"No party disputes that the child in this case was not conceived using ART (assisted reproductive technology), as at-home artificial insemination does not 'involve the laboratory handling of human eggs or preembryos.' … Thus, the situation, contemplated by the statutory scheme as a whole, did not occur here. As such, Rivera has not automatically relinquished his paternal rights and obligations to the child at issue, and his legal rights must be determined by other sources of law addressing paternity," Grosshans wrote, partially quoting a definition in state law.

Grosshans was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Carlos Muniz and Justices Charles Canady and Jorge Labarga. But Justice John Couriel wrote a dissenting opinion, disputing that the 1993 law only applies to donors when assisted reproductive technology is used.

"To support this reading, the majority observes that the 1993 act aimed to provide a legal framework for such technology," wrote Couriel, who was joined in the dissent by Justices Renatha Francis and Meredith Sasso. "And no doubt the 1993 act was a response to technological and social developments. But no statutory or historical context supports rewriting the statute as the majority undertakes to do."

Couriel wrote that "our laws about parentage reflect a consistent legislative design that assigns two, and only two, parents to a minor child."

"That Salas and Brito have parental rights has never been disputed in this litigation, and there is no indication that either would forfeit those rights," the dissent said. "But now, the majority authorizes Rivera to become parent number three. This might be good or bad policy by the court's lights, but it is not our law."

But Grosshans wrote that arguments about three parents are flawed. The majority opinion said it only addresses a "narrow question" about whether Rivera automatically relinquished his paternal rights.

"We do not address, as the dissent implies, whether Rivera is likely to succeed in establishing any legal rights under the statutes governing paternity, especially given that the child in question was born within an intact marriage," Grosshans wrote.