NTSB gives new details on LaGuardia collision

[INAUDIBLE] CNN. Given the fact that combining controller positions has been a factor in previous incidents that you've investigated, including the DCA mid-air collision, what would you say now that we know positions were combined in the control tower cab on Sunday night? Is that a safe practice? And does it make you upset that the positions were combined? So there's a little bit of a difference in-- the question is on combining positions because we saw the combining of positions in the mid-air collision. And that occurred near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport about a year ago. Our understanding right now-- and again, this is preliminary and subject to change. Our understanding is that in the DCA mid-air, there were procedures followed, a list, like traffic volume, staffing available, training, workload, that was considered in order to combine positions like the helicopter position and local control position in DCA. In this situation, for the midnight shift, it is standard operating procedure that they only have two on duty. And those two perform the duties of other controllers. That is our understanding right now. However, we're going to further dig into that as part of our investigation. Certainly, I can tell you that our air traffic control team has stated this is a problem, that this is a concern for them for years, that they have had this concern for quite a long time. I can understand it's a concern, especially if there's a heavy workload.

As ASDE-X did not work, and during the near-collisions of 2023, you repeatedly said that ASDE-X should be at more airports and it could prevent collisions, how upset does it make you that it's clear that it did not work in this scenario? Well, the question is, how upset does it make me that ASDE-X didn't work because we've repeatedly recommended that ASDE-X work? Well, in order for ASDE-X to work well, you have to know where ground vehicles and aircraft are. So in this case, that ground-- that vehicle did not have a transponder. And it would have been helpful. When you have a radar target, it does not provide you with the information that you need like it would for an aircraft as a controller. Yes?

I'm Jackson Proskow from Global News in Canada. Is there any indication from the voice data recorders that the pilots saw the fire truck and were aware it was on the runway? Is there any indication from the CVR that the pilot saw the fire truck on the runway? I don't have information at this time on that. However, we are doing further analysis on our cockpit voice recorder. We have a group that we have formed that will analyze the CVR. And part of when they analyze is they will talk in the group about what they're hearing, what they've heard, any sort of background noises. And we'll provide a transcript. And then we'll release that publicly. So we'll know more then.

[INAUDIBLE], Andrew Siff from NBC4 New York, WABC-TV. With regard to the midnight shift, is it literally a midnight shift that you've expressed concerns about in the past, or is it that later shift, when there's typically less traffic at an airport? The reason I ask it is around this time, late at night on a Sunday night at LaGuardia, there are still lots of [INAUDIBLE]. To that degree, does that raise questions about the protocol and staffing here at this airport? So the question is about the shift, and are we just concerned about that shift in the past, or would there be other shifts? And does it make sense to have two controllers in the cab with such a busy airport and this be standard operating procedures and common practice across the national airspace? I think I restated it accurately and have now forgotten what you asked me. But on your standard operating procedure, on the standard operating procedures, look, LaGuardia is 900 flights, I believe, per day. That's pretty substantial. It's not the same as other airspace-- or other airports across the national airspace. That's certainly something we will look at as part of this investigation. Would that make sense? Why would that make sense at LaGuardia? That is part of our analysis in this investigation. And what was the other one? Oh, on the mid-shift, we have identified the mid-shift generally as concern in other investigations, largely due to fatigue, because it spans that time frame at your circadian low during the day when you're most fatigued.

Madam Chair? Yes?

[INAUDIBLE] We're talking about [INAUDIBLE] airports. So [INAUDIBLE] about the [INAUDIBLE] possibility that these agents are having their towers, I'm trying to think, did they know that the other person is doing the other responsibility? Is there a moment that they [INAUDIBLE] as to who is doing what [INAUDIBLE] responsibility at a time? Do we know [INAUDIBLE] trying to help the [INAUDIBLE] emergencies, whether it was confusion on the runway? The question was, could there potentially be confusion among the two controllers of who's having what discussion? And could it be that they were both having the same communications, or there were different communications or conflicting information-- communications at--

[INAUDIBLE] more than one job. --since they're doing more than one job? I can't answer that right now because that's something we have to investigate as part of this accident scenario. Those are the exact types of questions that we'll ask when we interview the controllers, both the two that were in the cab at the time, and the other controllers that may have been on duty, and include previously or after that. One thing I want to do is come back to something that Pete asked about, which is controllers and the information they should have in ASDE-X in our past recommendations. Controllers should have all the information and the tools to do their job, all the information they need. We've recommended ASDE-X. But you have to have information on the ground movements, whether that's aircraft or vehicles moving on the airport, in taxiways, on runways. They should have all the information. This is 2026. The Secretary talks about upgrading our air traffic control system. We have an old air traffic control system. This is why he talks about that. We need to upgrade. But we also need to improve safety across the air. It's not just air traffic control. It's safety all around. Yes?

Chairperson, Matt Chayes again from Newsday. I'm wondering first, is it common for ground vehicles to have transponders? And second, what does it mean that a transmission, the radio transmission, was "stepped on"? With respect to transponders, the question is, is it common for ground vehicles to have transponders? I don't have the latest figures on that. I would suggest speaking with the Federal Aviation Administration on that, or you can contact Eric. And we'll get back to you on numbers. Should they? That's something we'll determine as part of our investigation. I will tell you that not having a recommendation-- yeah, they should. Even though we don't have a recommendation, air traffic controllers should know what's in-- before them, whether it's on airport surface or in the airspace. They should have that information to ensure safety. Now, that's not an NTSB recommendation. So I want to be clear. But it could be. We don't know. And your other question on stepped on, the communication was stepped on, interfere-- it means there may have been a mic key or some sort of interference or interruption of the transmission.

And why would that be significant? Because somebody else on the other-- why would that be significant? He was asking the question on what does "stepped on" mean with respect to communications. That would be significant because that would mean that somebody may not hear the other part of that communication. Yes, sir?

NJ Burkett with WABC-TV. Oh, I went-- go ahead.

If I may, thank you. Does the data recorder give any indication that the pilots made any attempt at evasive action? And you're probably asking about the flight data recorder. We don't have information, the download from the flight data recorder, yet. That group, I believe, is getting together today to start going through the data. We do have good data. But they're going to start looking at it today. And we'll provide further information down the line. You, and then you.

Similar to that question-- Nate Schweber, New York Times--was there any evidence that the truck tried to swerve or brake crossing the runway? And could you confirm the names of the pilots who died? I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.

Could you confirm the names of the pilots who died? Can I confirm the names of the pilots who passed away? No. I would refer you to the New York City chief medical examiner. We don't confirm any fatalities, injuries, or names. And your other question?

The truck-- did it turn-- did it brake-- any evidence? With respect to the truck, did the truck turn and-- or brake? I've probably seen the same CCTV video that you have. We have to do some further investigation on that, including interviews of both firefighters that were on board. And then right here.

[INAUDIBLE] Montreal. Do we know if the two people in the truck heard the "stop" when they were saying the command to stop [INAUDIBLE] truck one [INAUDIBLE]? The question is, do we know if the two firefighters in the firefighting vehicle heard the directive to stop? We don't know that yet. We need to do interviews of those two firefighters. David?

[INAUDIBLE] from Reuters. In 2023, you held a forum on runway incursions and near misses. business. And as a result, [INAUDIBLE] started rolling out this runway [INAUDIBLE] device [INAUDIBLE] we know about, was there any other additional technology [INAUDIBLE]? And as part of that, [INAUDIBLE] had been mandated [INAUDIBLE] for both the fire truck and transponder [INAUDIBLE]? The first question on other technology that would have been available to alert to the controllers-- I'm not-- I don't have that to provide at this time. Our investigators have to begin their analysis. Again, this is our first full day on scene. And we're not even through the day. But we will have more information on what types of technology might have been available to them. The second question is on whether ADS-B in and out would have helped prevent this. I would just caution, and I've heard the discussion on ADS-B in and out with respect to this particular collision, it happened very quickly. And we need to match up times. We need to look at visibility with respect to the airplane coming in and look at the movement and visibility of those in the truck. So we can't say at this time whether that would have made a difference or not.

Thank you. Thank you.

Madam chair, can I ask one question about the transponder? One question.

Any indication as to why truck 1 did not have a transponder when other trucks did [INAUDIBLE]? Let me clarify. The question is on transponder on that truck. We have no indication there were transponders on any of the trucks. But there are transponders on other trucks at other airports across the nation. In this case, they did not have transponders. Thank you. No, no.

All right. You have been listening to the National Transportation Safety Board giving us the latest information, hearing from the chair there. That's Jennifer Homendy. She started off by saying that there was a lot of preliminary information that would come out of this and that it was "subject to change." Key notes here-- a summary of the voice recorder that was about three minutes long, giving us a play-by-play of what was happening leading up to the crash. She mentioned that there were questions about the number of certified controllers in the vicinity and said that there would be a 4:00 PM interview with one of those lead controllers. She said that they were looking to rectify inconsistencies in logs. She said that there were two people in a tower cab, a local controller and a controller in charge, saying that usually, there are two other officials, and they're doing the safety operations and the clearance delivery position, but saying that they have raised concerns about one person doing the job of two people, but acknowledging that that was standard operating procedure because of the time of day. Of course, we'll continue to follow this story-- a lot more to learn from the investigation.