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Key Congressman Questions Watchlist Technology

(CBS/ AP)
In his review of the Northwest Flight 253 bomb attempt, President Obama acknowledged that the U.S. intelligence community failed to collect and share data that could have potentially uncovered and disrupted the plot.

The review didn't attribute the failure to connect the dots to barriers in information sharing among agencies and departments, as was the case at the time of 9/11.

The president didn't assign blame to particular individuals or agencies.

The root of the failure, according to report, is that the U.S. intelligence community didn't increase resources working on the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) threat.

The overall White House message is that the intelligence community is doing a good job but needs to be more accountable and focused. Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan said the intelligence community worked "seamlessly well" following the Christmas day incident.

But something in the intelligence community appears to be broken. Data was not correlated and turned into actionable information, despite a number of signals, including the Nigerian bomber's father's warnings.

The White House review almost skipped over what is likely a significant smoking gun in the U.S. counterterrorism apparatus.

"Information sharing within the CT (counterterrorism) community did not sufficiently allow the correlation of data that would have enabled analysts to highlight the relevant threat information," the White House review stated.

Computer systems, not humans, are really good at correlating data, connecting the dots from a database with millions of bits. Humans can do a good job of analysis; but if the data isn't correlated and then surfaced, terrorists can board planes.

White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs was asked during the daily press briefing Friday whether incomplete and faulty database searches, as well as the information technology within the counterterrorism community, were culprits in the Abdulmutallab incident.

Gibbs didn't answer question specifically. Instead he talked generally about improvements and technological advances since 9/11, and knocking down walls between databases.

"…we have to ensure, as the president did in his individual recommendations -- ensure that there is the assignment of responsibility and the quick dissemination of all of that information, and that we do so in a technological way that allows us to keep up with the constant flow of important information that's coming in," Gibbs said.

(CBS/ AP)
But the chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight for the U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology isn't convinced that the intelligence community is on track with its technology. The committee, headed by Rep. Brad Miller, D-N.C., seen at left, handles investigations into corruption, secrecy and junk science involving tax dollars.

Sixteen months ago, Rep. Miller sent a letter to Inspector General Office of the Director of National Intelligence requesting an investigation of the technical failure and mismanagement of Railhead, a half-billion dollar program that was intended to update and enhance the National Counterterrorism Center's TIDE (Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment) database. TIDE is the core of the FBI's consolidated terrorist watchlist.

"The end result is a current IT (information technology) system used to identify terrorist threats that has been crippled by technical flaws and a new system that if actually deployed will leave our country more vulnerable than the existing yet flawed system in operation today," Rep. Miller wrote on Aug. 21, 2008.

"We heard from whistleblowers, contractors and NCTC (National Counterterrorism Center) personnel," Rep. Miller told CBS News on Friday.

"They said the computer program was a mess, in a state where the program not only couldn't connect the dots, it couldn't find the dots. There was also poor management and a lack over government oversight and turf battles among contractors. It seemed the system was unable to do things that Google does routinely, such as identify similar name, and based on the Christmas day event, it apparently still can't do that."

The White House review released Thursday noted that a misspelling of Abdulmutallab's name in a database could have led to his detention prior to getting on a plane.

Directive from President Obama
Summary of White House Review

"Mr. Abdulmutallab possessed a U.S. visa, but this fact was not correlated with the concerns of Mr. Abdulmutallab's father about Mr. Abdulmutallab's potential radicalization. A misspelling of Mr. Abdulmutallab's name initially resulted in the State Department believing he did not have a valid U.S. visa. A determination to revoke his visa however would have only occurred if there had been a successful integration of intelligence by the CT community, resulting in his being watchlisted."

(CBS/AP)
NCTC Chief Response

Michael Leiter, at left, director of the
NCTC, disputed Rep. Miller's critique. Leiter, who has been in the news for going on vacation the day after the failed bomb attack , wrote a letter to the editor published by the New York Times on Aug. 25, 2008:

"To suggest that the National Counterterrorism Center's support to watchlisting is 'on the brink of collapse,' as the subcommittee press release stated, is patently ridiculous.

"The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment continues to do exactly what it was designed to do: serve as the nation's database of terrorist information. In early 2008, the National Counterterrorism Center identified a number of issues associated with the Railhead contract. Corrective actions were initiated and the center briefed Congressional oversight committees.

"The subcommittee's chairman, Brad Miller, and his staff never engaged with the National Counterterrorism Center to address their concerns. Mr. Miller, his committee and ultimately your readers would have been better informed had such basic steps been taken."


Responding Friday to Leiter's past remarks, Rep. Miller said he was unable to engage with the National Counterterrorism Center because whistleblowers working in the intelligence bureaucracy could not receive legal protection.

"The distinct impression I had was the NCTC wanted no part of oversight or criticism. They offered belligerent assurance that nothing major was wrong. They said they had no idea what we were talking about and prevailed upon the Intelligence Committee to assert jurisdiction," Rep. Miller said. "The law would not allow us to protect whistleblowers, so we couldn't proceed with an investigation."

"It sounds like everything that failed with the Christmas bomber was what the computer system was supposed to handle — taking information from a lot of sources and if it pertained to the same guy, it would go ding, ding, ding."

Next week, Rep. Miller plans to talk to his House Science Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee staff to discuss how to move forward on this issue.

"Someone needs to figure what has gone on with IT programs that we heard a year and a half ago were a mess," he said.

Dan Farber is editor-in-chief of CBSNews.com

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