The Rewards Of Wisdom

This column was written by Matthew Continetti .

The surge is over. The last of the reinforcements sent to Iraq have returned home. The Iraq those troops leave behind is an utterly transformed place. Since their first offensive operations began in July 2007, overall attacks have been cut by 80 percent. The sectarian bloodshed staining Iraq in 2006 and 2007 has almost entirely abated. American casualties have fallen dramatically, with U.S. combat deaths in Iraq in July 2008 the lowest monthly total since the war began more than five years ago. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been routed, and the global al Qaeda organization faces what CIA director Michael Hayden calls a "near-strategic defeat" in Iraq. Shiite radical Moktada al-Sadr remains "studying" in Iran, while his militia has been cut to pieces by U.S. and Iraqi troops. The Iraqi army is progressing admirably; more than two-thirds of Iraqi combat battalions now take the lead in operations in their areas.

As the advocates of the surge predicted, a population that feels secure is a population more willing and able to reach political compromise. The Iraqi government has met almost all of the "benchmarks" the U.S. Congress set for it, and, although a national hydrocarbons law remains elusive, the country's oil wealth is being divided among its 18 provinces. That wealth is increasing dramatically as security has allowed oil production to return to prewar levels (and as prices have soared). The major Sunni political bloc has rejoined the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The Awakening, which began in Sunni-dominated Anbar province in the fall of 2006, has blossomed into a trans-sectarian, national, grassroots political movement. And Iraq is busy preparing for provincial and national elections that will further accelerate reconciliation by broadening and deepening the political participation of all the major groups.

It is worth pausing to reflect on what might have happened had Bush given in to popular opinion in January 2007 and abandoned Iraq. No one, of course, can say with absolute assurance how things would have turned out had the president opted to listen to Senator Obama rather than Senator McCain. But, at the very least, it is foolish to suggest that any of the military or political progress we have made in the last year and a half could have been achieved with a reduced U.S. "footprint" in Iraq. After all, it was the "light footprint" strategy of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Generals John Abizaid and George Casey that allowed the turmoil in Iraq to spin out of control between 2003 and 2007. The fact that America was continually looking for the exit during those years forced our allies in Iraq to hedge their bets and allowed our enemies to raise the pressure, eagerly anticipating the moment when they would have Iraq all to themselves.

Had Bush listened to Obama and decided to retreat last year, not only would the progress we see today not have occurred, but it is quite likely that the situation in Iraq would be much worse than it was at the end of 2006. Bereft of U.S. security, Iraqis would have turned to the nearest sectarian militia for protection from the widening civil war. An empowered and belligerent Iran would have moved to fill the vacuum America left behind, thus allowing the mullahs in Tehran to pursue unchecked their policy of "Lebanonization" in Iraq. And Al Qaeda in Iraq would have continued its barbaric killing spree, using the departing American soldiers as a recruitment tool, evidence of American weakness and unreliability. It would not be al Qaeda but the United States facing a "near strategic defeat" on Osama bin Laden's chosen front. And a defeated America would have led to a more dangerous world.

Fortunately, none of this came to pass. Bush sided with McCain, who had been calling for additional troops and a counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq since late summer 2003. We wonder what might have been averted -- and what might have been accomplished -- if Bush had adopted McCain's strategy five years ago. Whatever might have been, it was Bush's decision in 2007 that clearly put the United States and Iraq on the path to success. Those who attribute the gains in Iraq to other causes are deluding themselves. The Anbar Awakening might not have survived a year had it not been for the surge's demonstration of American commitment and resolve. Sadr fled to Iran and declared numerous "cease-fires" because Generals Petraeus and Odierno's full-spectrum warfare caught him off-guard. The sectarian militias were denied a safe haven and separated from the Iraqi population through effective counterinsurgency policies.

One of the chief lessons of the surge is that we are not powerless. Policy matters. The previous policy in Iraq was failing; Bush tried a new policy that is working. Another lesson is that, in this era of "soft" or "smart" power, force is still an effective means of achieving strategic goals. Those who argued that violence in Iraq would not stop until political accords were reached ignored the lessons of the first years of the war, when the Iraqis made great gains politically at a time of worsening violence. It was thought then, too, that the political gains would result in a more secure Iraq. Not so. When violence careened out of control in 2006, the Iraqi government was powerless to stop it. "Soft" power was useless. Military might was required to staunch the bleeding. And only when the violence was brought under control through the application of deadly force could politics resume and Iraq make its first real steps toward normality.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, experience cannot be separated from judgment. Experience matters. It was a lifetime of service and involvement in national security issues that gave McCain the perspective and insight to urge a change in strategy as early as 2003. When it came to Iraq it was the old man, McCain, not the young, fresh, and cool Obama, who was flexible in judgment and willing to try a new approach. And Obama has been inflexible in his error. He continues to advocate a political timetable for withdrawal from Iraq and states that he still would have opposed the surge regardless of its clear success. But a precipitous and premature withdrawal would undermine all the gains made in the last year and a half, and a timeline would breathe new life into the enemies of a stable and democratic Iraq. Barack Obama not only lacks experience and judgment; he lacks the capacity to admit he made a mistake and is therefore willing to risk everything the surge has achieved. Obama got it wrong when the stakes were greatest, and on the central issue of our time. Why on earth would we choose to reward him for it?
By Matthew Continetti
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