Iran Nuke Q & A
U.S. and European diplomats are campaigning behind the scenes Thursday in a last-minute effort to gain consensus for reporting Iran to the U.N. Security council over concerns its seeking nuclear weapons. What the Security Council will do yet is not yet clear, but the Iranians are already threatening retaliation, CBS News Correspondent Sheila MacVicar reports. She answers questions about what this all means.
If this goes to the Security Council, what does that mean?
Senior U.S. officials have told CBS News they have a majority of votes among the member nations of the IAEA to pass a resolution reporting Iran to the Security Council for failure to comply with its obligations under a Non-Proliferation Safeguards Agreement.
The Security Council, which U.S. Ambassador John Bolton presides over this month, is likely to agree to wait for a further, and more detailed, IAEA report due Mar. 6 before taking any action. In the intervening weeks, diplomats will try to persuade Iran to give the IAEA the information it requires. Otherwise the Security Council will begin to consider other options, including some form of sanctions. There's no agreement on what to do if Iran does not comply.
The Iranians, however, have all of their leadership speaking from the same page, and they have threatened to stop voluntary co-operation with the nuclear inspectors. They have already broken the seals on uranium enrichment equipment and say they are ready to re-start work on enrichment activities. (Their suspension was voluntary, and Iran does have a legal right to enriched uranium).
What impact will it have if Iran stops voluntary co-operation?"
The Iranians say that by law, if referred to the Security Council, they are obliged to end voluntary co-operation. That co-operation permits IAEA inspectors to demand to see more sites, ask more questions, examine dual use equipment and imports and exports. IAEA inspectors would be restricted to "declared sites," and would lose the broader sense, however limited, they now have of the Iranian program.
So what's the key question?
Are the Iranians really interested in only nuclear power and uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes ... or do they want The Bomb? There's no smoking mushroom cloud yet, but the IAEA inspectors, helped by intelligence provided by the US and others, have come up with some worrying evidence that suggests, in the words of the current IAEA report, a "military-nuclear" dimension.
Why didn't Iran just comply superficially with IAEA mandates and continue to covertly work on producing a nuclear weapon?
Simply put, they got caught. There have been rumblings for years in intelligence circles about what the Iranians were up to. In 2002, an Iranian opposition group exposed two secret facilities the government had not told the IAEA about. In Dec. 2002, the U.S. accused Iran of attempting to make nuclear weapons. That launched a more aggressive IAEA inspection regime, and by June 2003, the Director-General of the agency declared that Iran "failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities." We now know that was an understatement.
Why is the international community so suspicious of Iran?
It didn't take long for the IAEA to uncover evidence that for 18 years, at least, the Iranians were running a covert program they successfully concealed.
What's the evidence they were/are working on a weapon?
For the first time, an IAEA document makes clear there is a link between Iran's nuclear energy work, and work on a weapons design.
As recently as 2003, international sources say Iran conducted experimental explosions of a "type that could also be used to prepare for future nuclear weapons tests."
A U.S. intelligence agency obtained a laptop from an Iranian defector which included theoretical work on a missile warhead which would explode in the air above a target. Analysts say such a device would be useful only with the nuclear warhead.
The IAEA says it has found what it called "administrative interconnections" between uranium enrichment programs, the high explosives testing and the warhead work.
CBS News has learned "administrative interconnections" means organizations either part of, or linked to, Iran's military, which should play no part in a peaceful program.
Diplomatic sources tell CBS News that all U.S. intelligence agencies, and more importantly perhaps, those of European countries which are not allied with the US over Iraq, agree that Iran has a covert weapons program.
If the IAEA inspectors think Iran is up to no good, why should they have access to nuclear technology at all?
It's a long story, which goes back to a simpler time. The international community agreed nuclear weapons were a bad thing, and to limit their spread, and to persuade those, like the U.S., which already had them, to disarm, they came up with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The idea was that using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, like power generation was good. But because the processes used to produce fuel for electricity generation or a nuclear warhead are essentially the same, nations were asked to sign the Treaty, saying they'd behave.
The problem is the Treaty trusts nations to declare what they are really up to, and asks inspectors to make sure they're not cheating on what they say they've got.
Iran signed the NPT, and ratified it, in 1970, under the era of the Shah. He had plans to construct 20 nuclear power stations. They were never built, but by the 1990's the Iranians again were openly interested in nuclear energy and signed a deal with Russia to build a power plant. (Under current NPT rules, having a power plant permits you to master the enrichment technology.)
What is the IAEA anyway? Why can't they do more?
The International Atomic Energy Agency administers the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It's a creature of its 139 members. Its roots lie in a speech from President Eisenhower, who envisaged the creation of an international body to control and develop the peaceful use of atomic energy (Eisenhowers' "Atoms for Peace" speech).
Dealing with countries like Iran (and recently, Iraq and Libya) requires robust investigation. The member states have not given IAEA inspectors that power (with the exception of the weapons inspections carried out in Iraq). As it is, they require at least some co-operation from Iran to be able to carry out what can be described as "nuclear forensics." It was never meant to be a nuclear FBI.
Iran says it's co-operating. What's the problem?
The co-operation is incomplete. We've already talked about the one page the Iranians have handed over regarding the contact with the Khan rogue network in 1987.
The Iranians have prevented, or limited access to some sites. In late Jan., 2006 IAEA inspectors were finally permitted to visit a site called Lavizan, near Tehran. It was a military installation, razed to the ground after opposition groups alleged it was being used in the nuclear program. Most important for the inspectors, they wanted access to the equipment that had been at Lavizan, and to talk to the scientist who ran the facility (the IAEA knows who he is). They were shown some of the equipment, but prohibited from meeting the scientist, on the grounds that he "is in the military." (And that alone is not reassuring).
How do we get out of this mess?
First, diplomats are very keen to emphasize that military action is not an option (though Israeli generals have made worrying noises. Iran has many facilities, and perhaps, many more concealed facilities).
Action by the Security Council would probably take the form of sanctions, but there is no agreement on what kind of sanctions, or how effective they would be.
European Union states had tried to negotiate with Iran, offering a "non-nuclear technology transfer" if the Iranians gave up on uranium enrichment. But non-EU sources familiar with what was on the table said the package was not attractive enough, and did not, for example, include access to new airplanes or rail technology.
The best bet would seem to be continuing diplomacy (the U.S. is of the view that Iran has become more co-operative only after pressure has been applied), especially through the Russians.
Russia has put a proposal on the table where it would enrich uranium for power plant use in Iran in its own, existing enrichment facilities. Iran would use the fuel under international safeguards, and return the spent rods to Russia for re-processing.
The Iranians insist they want to exercise their right to mastery of enrichment technology, and even if they agree to the Russian arrangement, want to continue to run an research and development line.
That sounds reasonable. What's wrong with that?
Given Iran's history of concealment, and lack of confidence in its' motives, the fear is the Iranians could happily run nuclear power reactors with Russian fuel while mastering enrichment technology. And then at some point in the future, announce, like North Korea, that they are abrogating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, putting an end to any IAEA oversight. Having mastered the technology, it might then take just months to accumulate enough weapons-grade enriched uranium to make a bomb.
How far is Iran from the bomb, and who else should I be worried about?
U.S. intelligence estimates that if Iran went full speed on a weapons program, AND was able to overcome its considerable technical difficulties (there have been problems with various stages of the enrichment process and most of the technology they are believed to have access to is old), they could have a nuclear weapon perhaps by the end of this decade. Other analyses suggest it could take up to ten years.
Meanwhile, if you're not worried yet, here are some others who are believed to be in the nuclear market: Saudi Arabia, Brazil, South Africa. Libya has abandoned its program. North Korea is believed to either have, or be close to a weapon, but it is outside all international safeguards, as is Israel which probably has an arsenal of nuclear weapons. The declared nuclear powers are the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India and Pakistan.
By Sheila MacVicar