Last Updated Apr 17, 2009 7:17 PM EDT
Mark also seems to assume that all members of the shadow banking system are equally risky. But they are not. Only some members of the shadow banking sector-most especially those controlled or subsidized by regulated institutions-created the risks that eventually resulted in the financial crisis. In fact, some shadow banking members have reduced those risks or mitigated losses to investors. In particular, hedge funds lost a comparatively much smaller amount for their investors than did the overall stock market. As noted in a report by Credit Suisse, in 2008 global stocks lost 42 percent of their value while hedge funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller 19 percent for their investors and did so with lower monthly volatility.
Hedge funds also brought much-needed liquidity to markets with thinly traded financial instruments. Although it is not clear what it would mean to bring in hedge funds under the scope of traditional banking regulation, these benefits would probably not be possible if hedge funds were subject to the same restrictions as regulated mutual funds on their use of leverage, derivatives, and short-selling.
The Feds can't actually regulate hedge funds
A second problem with attempts at comprehensive bank-like regulation of hedge funds is the more practical issue of making those rules effective. Because governmental officials have limited resources and financial expertise, bringing hedge funds under the direct oversight of federal regulators may simply be too burdensome. It could also lead parties to become more complacent about risk. In a May 2006 speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke explained these problems when he commented on a proposal for federal regulators to monitor hedge fund liquidity risk directly:
To measure liquidity risks accurately, the authorities would need data from all major financial market participants, not just hedge funds. As a practical matter, could the authorities collect such an enormous quantity of highly sensitive information in sufficient detail and with sufficient frequency (daily, at least) to be effectively informed about liquidity risk in particular market segments? How would the authorities use the information?... Perhaps most important, would counterparties relax their vigilance if they thought the authorities were monitoring and constraining hedge funds' risk-taking? A risk of any prescriptive regulatory regime is that, by creating moral hazard in the marketplace, it leaves the system less rather than more stable.One lesson that the financial crisis should have taught us are the dangers of relying on federal regulators and other third parties such as credit rating agencies to monitor the risks that market participants should investigate and monitor themselves. Given the failures of governmental oversight and private risk-management that helped lead to the financial crisis, we should be extremely wary of any government proposals to also oversee hedge funds and other nonbank firms.
Follow Blog War on regulating the financial sector:
- Monday, April 13, Mark Thoma: Avoid the Next Crisis: Regulate Shadow Banks
- Monday, April 13, Houman Shadab: Don't Blame All the Shadow Banks
- Tuesday, April 14, Mark Thoma: Don't Leave the Door Open to Another Financial Crisis
- Tuesday, April 14, Houman Shadab: Why Too Much Regulation Increases Risk
- Wednesday, April 15, Mark Thoma: Getting in Front of the Next Crisis Requires Broad-Based Regulation
- Wednesday, April 15, Houman Shadab: Why Didn't Regulators See the Current Crisis Coming?
- Thursday, April 16, Mark Thoma: Why We Need Smart Financial-System Regulation Now
- Thursday, April 16, Houman Shadab: Shadow Banks Don't Threaten Healthy Banks
- Friday, April 17, Mark Thoma: Why Self-Regulation of the Financial System Won't Work
- Friday, April 17, Houman Shadab: Important Principles for a New Financial Regulatory System