New Questions Over Electronic Voting

A basket full of memory cards, used to record votes made on electronic voting machines, at the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections in Cleveland, Ohio. November 7 marks the first general election in which the county's 1 million voters will be using electronic voting machines, after an initial trial in May's primary wa smarred by delays, lost disks, and uninformed or tardy election workers. AP Photo/Jamie-Andrea Yanak

Disks containing what appears to be software code used in Maryland's touch-screen voting machines for the 2004 election were delivered anonymously to a former state legislator, prompting election officials to contact the FBI and raising new concerns about the reliability of the voting system.

The disks were delivered with an unsigned note to former Democratic Delegate Cheryl Kagan, an outspoken critic of the paperless electronic voting machines. The note said the disks had been "accidentally picked up" in the state election board offices.

Michelle Crnkovich, a spokeswoman for the FBI in Baltimore, said she could not comment on the investigation except to confirm that the agency had been contacted and asked to look into how the tapes reached Kagan's office.

Ross Goldstein, deputy elections administrator, said the disks did not belong to the Maryland board, but acknowledged that the software was used in the 2004 election. The disks contained labels indicating they came from testing labs that the state paid to test the reliability and security of the touch-screen voting machines made by Diebold, Inc.

Gov. Robert Ehrlich questions the reliability of the touch-screen machines and has suggested that Marylanders use absentee ballots if they have any doubts whether their votes will be counted accurately.

"This raises yet another unanswered question with regard to Diebold technology," said Henry Fawell, a spokesman for the governor.

This is another recent instance in which the security of electronic voting machines was brought into question, just weeks after a Princeton University study published in September demonstrated how at least one version of Diebold's electronic voting machines could be easily hacked to switch votes without leaving any trace of the corrupting software. A virus could also be spread from machine to machine via the memory cards used to tabulate votes. Diebold claims that the machine software studied is no longer in use.

In other developments:

  • A Denver judge has required Colorado's Secretary of State to work with county election boards to implement minimum security standards — developed with the help of voters who sued to stop the use of new voting machines — to ensure that machines are closely monitored before and during voting, and also required that machines be recertified and new standards developed following the election.

  • Nov. 7 will be the first general election with all 88 Ohio counties using either touch-screen electronic machines or ones that electronically scan paper ballots. Cuyahoga County, the state's most populous county, suffered enormous problems during last May's primary when poll workers had difficulties operating touch-screen machines, some poll workers didn't show up, vote memory cards disappeared and one precinct opened hours late. Counting of absentee ballots held up election results a further six days.

  • Louisiana Secretary of State Al Ater has asked voting machine manufacturer Sequoia to expedite delivery of 47 machines after the Grant Parish voting machine warehouse was flooded. State voting machine mechanics were assessing and testing the machines.

  • A Republican candidate in Connecticut is accusing his opponent of covering up the company that sold the state optical scan voting machines. Richard Abbate says Democratic Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz does not mention that the new machines were purchased from Diebold.

  • Utah state elections office announced that paper receipts of electronic voting machines will be audited after every election, to be checked against the results on the machine's memory card. The new regulations say at least one percent of the machines will be audited. In smaller races, it may be five percent, while congressional races will be three percent.

    In Maryland, the computer disks mailed to Kagan contained software for both the touch-screen machines and for the state board's computer election management system, which tabulates votes from the individual machines when voting ends on election day.

    Mark Radke, a spokesman for Diebold, said the software now used for the touch-screen machines in Maryland has many new security features not included on the earlier computer code. He said the labels on the disks refer to code that is no longer used in Maryland, but is used in "a limited number of jurisdictions."

    Avi Rubin, a Johns Hopkins University computer scientist who was among the early critics of paperless electronic voting systems, examined the disks at the request of The Washington Post. He said Friday he could not say whether the fact that the disks were turned over to Kagan represents any additional security threat for the general election in Maryland and elsewhere.

    "The code gives somebody the opportunity to define the weaknesses in the system," he said. "Maybe another copy went to somebody else."

    A statement issued by Diebold said it would "take years for a knowledgeable scientist" to break the encryption used on the software disks delivered to Kagan. But Rubin said the data files were not encrypted on the disk containing the Ballot Station software that runs the voting machines.

    EDITOR'S NOTE: In a previous version of this story, The Associated Press reported erroneously that Diebold Inc., a maker of voting machines, acquired LHS Associates. LHS, which is based in Methuen, Mass., is a vendor of Diebold equipment but it is not part of the company.

    • Melissa McNamara

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