Georgia-Russia: What We Still Don't Know

(The New Republic)  Joshua A. Tucker is Associate Professor of Politics at New York University, a National Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project, and a co-author of the political science and policy blog The Monkey Cage.

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Friday marked the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the Russian-Georgian War. Last summer, battles were fought, lives were lost, and land was destroyed. Yet one year out, what is most striking is how little the politics related to the war seem to have changed and how many questions surrounding the conflict remain unanswered.

Let's go back in time to early last August. In Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili was under attack from a hostile opposition that often took to the streets, accusing him of "hoarding and abusing power," according to The New York Times. But he looked likely to stay in power until the end of his term. In Russia, Dmitri Medvedev had recently ascended to the presidency, sparking speculation about who was really in charge--Medvedev or his predecessor, Vladimir Putin. Russian-Georgian relations were frosty, and rumors flew that conflict could break out at any time. Russian-U.S. relations were also relatively chilly, with points of conflict including U.S. plans for a missile defense system in Central Europe and the question of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, but the two nations were cooperating on some issues of common interest, such as containing terrorist threats.

While much about what triggered the war remains in dispute, late in the evening of August 7, Georgian forces entered South Ossetia, one of two breakaway Georgian republics. The following day, Russia responded by ordering troops into South Ossetia and, eventually, Georgia proper. After five days of fighting, the sides agreed to a truce, brokered by the French. However, Russian troops remained in and around South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the other breakaway republic.

Fast forward to early August 2009. Despite the war (or maybe because of it), Saakashvili is still in power. He continues to face frequent calls for his resignation but will probably survive until the end of his term. We are no closer than we were a year ago to understanding where power really lies between Putin and Medvedev, despite claims that the war demonstrated that Putin pulls all the strings. Russian-Georgian relations are extremely tense, with rumors surfacing in recent days of new between Georgia and its breakaway republics. (Tensions have apparently increased sufficiently that Obama and Medvedev spoke about the matter by phone last Tuesday.) And, while the overall tone of Russian-U.S. relations has improved somewhat since Obama took office--the issues of missile defense and new NATO members are being addressed with a bit more tact now--the two countries essentially remain what Daniel Korski, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, called "frienemies," cooperating on some issues and conflicting on others.

So what has changed in the past year? Most seriously, the price of oil, which was skyrocketing up toward $147 per barrel at this time last summer, has only recently returned to about half that level. Not coincidentally, the Russian economy has suffered mightily from the global economic crisis. (Georgia's economy has also suffered, both from the war and international economic developments.) Only Russia and Nicaragua have recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent. (Noticeably missing from this list is China, which one can only assume was not pleased to see Russia stoking the aspirations of separatist regions). Russian troops are still in the republics--despite complaints from Georgia about both their actions and locations, their number is fairly low--along with some EU monitors. Georgia has asked for U.S. monitors as well, but Russia has resisted the move.

In short, little related to this war has changed; despite the Russian military victory, neither side can really claim to have gained much. So what are we to make of the conflict? Four explanations for why the war occurred seem plausible. First, it may have been a "mistake" on Georgia's part. It's possible Saakashvili guessed wrong, thinking he could grab South Ossetia and get back under the West's protection before Russia did anything. Second, the war may have been a "mistake" on the part of a Russia determined to remove Saakashvili from power. Perhaps Moscow underestimated what the international community's reaction would be and/or overestimated the capabilities of the Georgian opposition to Saakashvili. Third, as I have suggested previously on this website, the war may have been an attempt by the Russians to send a costly "signal" about its concern with growing Western influence in the former Soviet republics--in particular, vis a vis Georgian or Ukrainian NATO membership.

Finally, the war may have been the start of a series of aggressive moves by Russia to reclaim parts of its former empire by force, as John McCain seemed to suggest last fall.

With regard to this fourth possibility, however, nothing we've seen since the conclusion of the war suggests that the Russia-on-the-march explanation is remotely likely. Moreover, forthcoming research in the journal Post-Soviet Affairs by University of Michigan professor William Zimmerman suggests that Russian foreign policy elites' conception of Russia's appropriate sphere of influence is sensitive to the price of oil. Put another way, if Russia restrained itself from going all the way to Tbilisi last summer with oil at $147 per barrel, it seems unlikely we'll see Russian troops in Ukraine anytime soon.

The other three explanations for the war all seem potentially credible, but we currently lack the evidence to distinguish among them. There is an international fact-finding report under the direction of a Swiss diplomat due out in September; perhaps we will learn more then.
And what comes next for Russian-Georgian relations depends largely on which explanation for the war turns out to be right. For instance, the status quo seems likely to persist if the war was a mistake on Georgia's part--even Saakashvili is unlikely to repeat that blunder--or if the war was a signal that Moscow believes the West has heard. (Which, perhaps, it has. See, for example, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's somber comments about the possibility of Georgia joining NATO.) This could also be the outcome if the war was a first step in renewed Russian aggression. But, even if that doubtful situation is the case, Russia has been sufficiently weakened by the economic crisis that it would have put such plans on hold.

More troubling is the possibility that we could witness a second Russian-Georgian War. Although a less likely outcome, this could follow if last year's war was a failed attempt on Russia's part to remove Saakashvili from power and it's still itching to get the job done, or if it was a signal that Moscow does not believe the West has yet heard. (We still don't know what the Russians have made of Obama's comments in Moscow last month about states like Georgia having a right to their own foreign policies.) And, while theoretically a gradual improvement in Russian-Georgian relations is always a possibility, as long as South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain out of Georgia's sovereign control, this is highly unlikely.

Perhaps it should not be surprising, though, that a war no one really seems to have won would yield so few definitive legacies.
By Joshua A. Tucker:
Reprinted with permission from The New Republic.

[kastner63]

Except for the U.S. where the reliablity of reporting in the matter Russia versus Georgia approached the reliability seen in papers like Prawda, the world knows that the war clearly started with Saakashvili overreaching himself. HE started the war, probably hopinhg he could get the Americans to interfere for Bush's darling and icon of democracy, Saakashvili. Even Bush was not stupid enough, though, and the Russians taught S. a lesson. Let's hope he has learned it well. For the rest, S. is a miserable dictator, intent on getting the press under control, and having his police forces act like they did in Soviet times. So, I do neither understand why Americans are so anxious to have Georgia in NATO (and thus provoke the Russians further, who are - whether the U.S. like it or not - the principal power in that area), or why they continue to support Saakashvili. A plague on both your houses should be the answer.

[Illuminated1]

It comes down to this, either the Russian Federation(formerly USSR) are going to behave business like, or they will behave militantly.
As I see it, the war has given the US a good oportunity to now state a new objective of the defense system.
We should now state that the missle defense system along with the defenses for the defenses will now include sustained attacks by superpowers as much as for terrorists as a result of the outcome in Georgia.
If we cannot trust the Russians, then we should prepare to fight them.

[SusanStoHelit]

Georgia tried to conquer it's province using the Olympics as cover, hoping no one would step in. They bombed civilians in the middle of the night. They killed innocent people. And they figured everyone would turn a blind eye. They got what they deserved - less than they deserved - the person who ordered it is still in office.

Our media - what can I say - bought and paid for - presented this as if Russia went in unprovoked. They didn't - Georgia started the war - then couldn't finish it when the weakling they were pounding on turned out to have a strong friend.

[timelythoughts]

Professor Joshua Tucker: I am taking the liberty of inserting herein my comments published in response to the Honorable Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard Bergman's editorial published in the Washington Post on August 7, 2009. One must not confuse U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty and its territorial integrity with an endorsement of President Mikheil Saakashvili. Indeed, Mr. Saakashvili's latest accusations that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin beyond wanting to hang him by unmentionable parts of his body now wants to "kill him," is a clear manifestation of just how close to a breaking point Mr. Saakashvili is. He is desperate to diffuse attention away from the now looming possibility that he may well be confronting a indictment by the U.S. Department of Justice for his complicity in the theft of the late Georgian tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili's estate, an estate with worldwide assets valued at $12 billion (USD). A war with Russia would accomplish that end! Hence his increasing vitriolic rhetoric against Mr. Putin.

Georgia's Unmet Promise
The U.S. must help ensure that democracy and good governance flourish.
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By Howard L. Berman

Comments ksvgt1 wrote:
Let us not equate Georgia's strategic importance to the U.S. in the region with President Mikheil Saakashvili.
The Honorable Howard L. Berman is most assuredly correct. Mr. Saakashvili does know what is required "to strengthen Georgia's nascent democracy..., further development of fair electoral processes, an independent judiciary, respect for human rights and the rule of law, a vibrant civil society, independent media, accountable and transparent policymaking, and a balance of power between the executive and legislative branches." It was political platform that catapulted him the presidency six years ago. That Mr. Saakashvili found it necessary to revisit his campaign pledges of six years ago to reassure a doubting parliament and with hope of quelling three months of civil unrest on the eve before Vice President Joseph Biden's visit must tell you something. As Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee you cannot be that clueless.

Please, I implore the Honorable Chairman to consider oversight hearings on what I am now given to understand is the invocation of State Secrecy Privilege by the Obama Administration on Mr. Saakashvili's complicity in the theft of the late Georgian tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili's estate. The Department of Justice Criminal Division and the FBI Eurasia and National Security Section relinquished their otherwise coveted jurisdiction of crimes committed in the U.S. by U.S. citizens over to the diplomatic core of State Department Europe and Eurasia Affairs, which fell to Matthew Bryza to mediate between Saakashvili and his top officials with Inna Gudavadze, Mr. Patarkatsishvili's widow and her legal team led by Lord Philip Goldsmith, QC and former Attorney General of the UK. Mr. Bryza was tasked with the formidable task of convincing Mr. Saakashvili to comply with rules of law to return the assets he unlawfully seized (and then sold) back to its rightful heirs and beneficiaries.

We are not talking about the theft of a bag of jellybeans here. We are talking about the theft of an estate with worldwide assets valued at $12 billion, an estate that belonged to Mr. Saakashvili's greatest nemesis. Mr. Saakashvili entered into an agreement with Joseph Kay, a distant cousin of Mr. Patarkatsishvili, and Emanuel Zeltser who had served as Mr. Patarkatsishvili's U.S. attorney for 14 years, to knowingly and willfully use forged estate documents to order the Tbilisi City Court to admit the forged estate documents into evidence and to recognize Mr. Kay as the lawful executor of Mr. Patarkatsishvili's estate. Lord Goldsmith, on behalf of Mr. Patarkatsishvili's widow and family, has lawsuits pending before the USDC, Southern District of New York and the International Court of Arbitration accusing Mr. Saakashvili of acting in collusion with Mr. Kay to unlawfully seize control of Mr. Patarkatsishvili's vast fortune--his worldwide assets.

Again, the Honorable Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee cannot be that clueless. A graymail plea offer was submitted to the Office of the General Counsel of the CIA on October 10, 2008, an admission of guilt, that carried with it an agreement to surrender the forged estate documents and the agreement structured between Messrs. Saakashvili and Kay. It landed in the hands of the DOJ, Attorney General Eric Holder, who acting on the recommendation of his former law partners at Covington & Burling, sought to shield Mr. Saakashvili in an attempt to seek resolution through restitution on behalf of Ms. Gudavadze, who is represented by APCO Worldwide, a public relations firm where Stuart Eizenstat holds a senior advisory position. Messrs. Eizenstat and Johnson were the first I approached on the graymail plea offer.

Clueless you are now not!

Karon von Gerhke

[babooph]

In the 1970s the Chinese were given exact Soviet troop movement from US camera s in the sky-odd they were not available 30 years later-lost technology ?