Oct. 5, 2008
A Look At Wall Street's Shadow Market
60 Minutes: How Some Arcane Wall Street Financial Instruments Magnified Economic Crisis
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Play CBS Video Video Wall Street's Shadow Market Steve Kroft looks at some of the arcane Wall Street financial instruments that have magnified the economic crisis.
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(AP Photo/Mark Lennihan)
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Timeline Financial Meltdown Track major events that lead to one of the most tumultuous times in Wall Street's history.
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Interactive Eye On The Economy In-depth features on U.S. markets, taxes, employment and the Federal Reserve.
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60 MINUTES
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Watch past 60 Minutes economy segments:
- July 1995: Derivatives
- October 2002: The Sheriff Of Wall Street
- September 2008: The Bailout
Before your eyes glaze over, Michael Greenberger, a law professor at the University of Maryland and a former director of trading and markets for the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, says they are much simpler than they sound. "A credit default swap is a contract between two people, one of whom is giving insurance to the other that he will be paid in the event that a financial institution, or a financial instrument, fails," he explains.
"It is an insurance contract, but they've been very careful not to call it that because if it were insurance, it would be regulated. So they use a magic substitute word called a 'swap,' which by virtue of federal law is deregulated," Greenberger adds.
"So anybody who was nervous about buying these mortgage-backed securities, these CDOs, they would be sold a credit default swap as sort of an insurance policy?" Kroft asks.
"A credit default swap was available to them, marketed to them as a risk-saving device for buying a risky financial instrument," Greenberger says.
But he says there was a big problem. "The problem was that if it were insurance, or called what it really is, the person who sold the policy would have to have capital reserves to be able to pay in the case the insurance was called upon or triggered. But because it was a swap, and not insurance, there was no requirement that adequate capital reserves be put to the side."
"Now, who was selling these credit default swaps?" Kroft asks.
"Bear Sterns was selling them, Lehman Brothers was selling them, AIG was selling them. You know, the names we hear that are in trouble, Citigroup was selling them," Greenberger says.
"These investment banks were not only selling the securities that turned out to be terrible investments, they were selling insurance on them?" Kroft asks.
"Well, it made it easier to sell the terrible investments if you could convince the buyer that not only were they gonna get the investment, but insurance," Greenberger explains.
But when homeowners began defaulting on their mortgages, and Wall Street's high-risk mortgage backed securities also began to fail, the big investment houses and insurance companies who sold the credit default swaps hadn't set aside the money they needed to pay off their obligations.
Bear Stearns was the first to go under, selling itself to J.P. Morgan for pennies on the dollar. Then, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy. And when AIG, the nation's largest insurer, couldn't cover its bad debts, the government stepped in with an $85 billion rescue.
Asked what role the credit default swaps play in this financial disaster, Frank Partnoy tells Kroft, "They were the centerpiece, really. That's why the banks lost all the money. They lost all the money based on those side bets, based on the mortgages."
Produced by L. Franklin Devine
© MMVIII, CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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See all 184 CommentsThese comments are not a real blog. In real life I''m 45north not north45 (rules). The rule against html is a constraint.
[Posted by deanhix at 11:07 AM : Oct 07, 2008]
did john mccain resist the lobbying efforts of wall street to keep the credit default swaps from remaining unregulated ... being the man of deregulation that he so proudly used to state?
what party controlled congress when mccain called for legislation to control freddie/fannie? why didn''t the republicans push the limits thru?
The metaphor in my mind is like a gambling addict trying to explain to his therapist & family that it''s not his bets that are losing him money, but the horses he''s betting on. It''s a skewed logic that only an addict could understand.
"If only the horses would win, I would win, CAN''T YOU SEE!"
The start of that sentence should include "mathematicians and physicists _working for financial houses_" and end with "eliminate most of the risk to themselves _and the corporations they worked for_."
And judging by some of the hundreds of millions being paid out to the execs who are now leaving the burning buildings cash in hand, it looks like they did their jobs well.
$80 Trillion or so in notional value according to the government agency that monitors banks
http://www.occ.treas.gov/deriv/deriv.htm
Where did you see $80 trillion?
The tables are in "millions" and JP shows
total Derivatives of $83,436,951,000.
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