Counting On Computers To Count The Votes

CBS News Technology Analyst Larry Magid Talks To Some Experts Worried About E-Voting

(CBS)  Just weeks before the November election, a session on e-voting at MIT's Emerging Technology conference on September 25th gave me the same level of warm and fuzzy that I got from watching President Bush's recent speech on the state of our economy.

How, I asked myself, can so many great minds screw things up so royally?

The panelists were united on one theme: The Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines that popped up around the country in the aftermath of the Florida debacle in the 2000 elections are as bad, or worse than those punch card machines that gave us the "hanging chad."

Panelists included California Secretary of State Debra Bowen; Doug Chapin, director of electionline.org; Ronald L. Rivest, professor of electrical engineering and computer science at MIT; and Pamela Smith, president of the Verified Voting Foundation.

It's not simply a question of whether these electronic machines are accurate and reliable, but also whether the voters perceive them as such. After all, many of these machines - at least initially - do not leave a paper trail.

"Nervousness has always been an issue," Chapin said, "even before the 2000 elections."

"The question," Rivest said, is "whether you can provide assurance that the count is providing the right answer."

He added: "Did the voter cast the vote as intended, was it collected as cast, and was it counted as collected?"

The problem, in part, stemmed from well-meaning federal legislation (Help America Vote Act of 2002) which provided funding for states to replace punch card or lever voting machines with systems that are less prone to confusion and miscounted votes.

Unfortunately, many of the machines used to replace these older systems had issues of their own, including vulnerability to hackers and lack of a paper trail to verify votes.

Essentially, voters were (and still are in some states) voting into a black hole. Only the hard drive or memory in the machine records their vote and as computer experts will tell you, software behind any electronic device is subject to all sorts of problems, bugs and limitations. What's more, the software code used in most of the machines is proprietary which makes it difficult to look at even by experts, let alone county election officials who often lack even the most basic technology experience.

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Podcast: Larry Magid speaks with Pamela Smith of VerifiedVoting.org and California Secretary of State Debra Bowen about e-voting in the U.S.

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Bowen, whose office sponsored an extensive review of machines used in California, questioned the software inside the machines. In 2007, the secretary of state commissioned a "top-to-bottom review" of voting machines that resulted in the decertification of DRE systems from Diebold, Hart InterCivic and Sequoia. At the time of the study, Bowen said that researchers were "able to bypass physical and software security in every machine they tested."

On the MIT panel, Bowen called for the use of open source software that is transparent to anyone with the technical skills to understand it. That may not include the average voter or election office, but with open source code, at least some software engineers have the ability to inspect and even improve code.

Proprietary software is closed to inspection without permission from the vendor who wrote the code. That's arguably OK for office applications used by businesses but not for software that determines who our future public officials will be.

After Bowen's review, California retired paperless voting machines.

"We don't use touch-screen-voting systems that don't leave a paper trail in California," said Bowen in an interview. She added that many states have moved away from touch-screen-voting systems entirely and have gone back to fill-in-the-bubble optical scan systems "because we know they are accountable."

About three-quarters of the states, according to Smith from the Verified Voting Foundation, "either passed a requirement for voter verified paper ballots or have bought equipment that is verifiable without having passed a law."

Unfortunately, Smith said, "that leaves out about a quarter of the states, including some large states such as Maryland, Georgia, large parts of Texas and most parts of Pennsylvania, which is a big swing state." A map on the Foundation's website shows what type of ballots are used in each state.

Both Smith and Bowen prefer paper ballots that can be read by high-speed scanners. If something goes wrong or if there's a challenge, question or recount, the paper is there as a backup.

Because of the way our Electoral College works, states that don't use a verifiable voting system could affect the outcome of our Presidential election. We all have a reason to care about every vote in every state, especially in those "swing" or "battleground" states where a small number of votes could determine who moves into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue next year.

Whether the Electoral College is a good or bad way to pick a president is beyond my expertise as a technology columnist, but I do know enough about technology to agree with computer scientists who question whether software and silicon is up to the task of reliably recording our votes.

[erasmus81]

For how much Americans are b*tching about the corruption in their country, I find it funny that there hasn''t been that many posts on this article. Of course CBS didn''t leave it out front for very long.

You would have thought that the American people would have done something about this problem by now.

[downsteamjim]

As long as the dead can vote, it will be OK with the DNC.

[ealuther]

I am an Election Official and we do use the DREs. I have one question. If everyone is so concerned about the machines, why does the public not show up for the public test that must be preformed before EVERY election???? The notice is published in the local paper. The public can call and ask when the test will be conducted. Makes me wonder if the majority of the public is really worried.

[erasmus81]

"Worry about the fact there is no one worth voting for." Posted by random_radar at 12:31 PM : Sep 30, 2008

Well, there is that too.

[erasmus81]

VOTE BUY HAND.

COUNT BY HAND.

LET THEM WAIT!

It''''s that important, America!

Posted by inventagod2 at 11:29 AM : Sep 30, 2008


That''s right!

With how corrupt everything is, you need to throw away ALL the voting machines and use paper ballots only.

[random_radar]

Why worry about voting machines? Worry about the fact there is no one worth voting for.

[bjudy1]

There is way too much history of ''strange'' counts happening to be just glitches. Check out and support blackboxvoting.org to see the depth of this challenge to our democracy.

[bigal321321]

Let me get this straight. We can invent computer systems that will manage and take our money on-line, all safe and secure (or so they say). Any yet, we can''t produce a voting machine that is secure? What''s wrong with this picture? I think the voting people need to talk to the folks at amazon.com or paypal.com and get a handle on things. I like the idea of open-source code. Because once you get a version number then any copy can be compared to the original. If anyone has messed with the code it would show up. We can send stuff to Mars but can''t do this. Something is very wrong and it isn''t technologies'' fault.

[legacyabq]

Inventagod2 is absolutley right on this..
Screw convenience, it is absolutley imperative that we can count and recount votes, without having to worry if their was error or fraud.
The "scan-tron" type voting machine, with a fill-in-the-bubble-with-the-pencil, is the most reliable and easy to double-check..
Tell your local representatives!
It doesnt matter if your a righty or a lefty, everyone wants their votes to count!!

[newsjunky5]

Does anyone remember the hit song, "Computers Never Lie" from years ago?

[inventagod2]

VOTE BUY HAND.

COUNT BY HAND.

LET THEM WAIT!

It''s that important, America!

[newsjunky5]

A local Washington DC election this month resulted in thousands of "phantom votes" from the machines. Were they intended for the last election, or the next?

[newsjunky5]

If you have spyware on your computer, you''ll notice it gets updated every couple of days with new virus definitions. Even if you are computer illiterate, this should be a clue as to the vulnerability of a computerized voting system.

[newsjunky5]

Well how about printing a receipt for the voter. He/she could double check how their vote was tallied... Does this sound like problem solved?
-----------------------------------
No. Because with a computer run machine it''s a simple matter to print out how you voted, but count it another way, or add votes. You''d have to assemble everyone and count their receipts if there was a problem, leading to more opportunity for fraud.
Just do it without a computer. It''s worth the extra time and trouble.
Still waiting for the day Alqueda cracks the code on the predator drones, and sends them back to us.

[gop_will_win]

Haha liberals, we shall win again thanks to voting machine errors! HAHAHAHAHA!

[jamjholmes]

Only a total idiot would trust the voting machines. They were implimented to control who gets elected, duh.

[mtngurl8]

What diebolds promise to help Bush deliver the votes didn''t inspire confidence? HMMM! I wonder why not?

[jerryspoor]

Hidden computer code owned exclusively by one corporation is highly impractical in a free and open election. The election becomes privitized and controlled with no inspection.

Would you trust me to count all the votes if I could hide the evidense of my findings and if I would get a substantial reward contract from the winning party?

[jn122736]

From the above article, "It''''s not simply a question of whether these electronic machines are accurate and reliable, but also whether the voters perceive them as such. After all, many of these machines - at least initially - do not leave a paper trail."
_________________

Well how about printing a receipt for the voter. He/she could double check how their vote was tallied. If the receipt is printed and it doesn''''t represent correctly the voter''''s choices, then have two edit and confirm buttons seperated by a large distance, on the computer to allow for changes. If the receipt is correct then it can be placed in a box for the paper trail, but that shouldn''''t be really necessary with the voter. After the voter has the opportunity to correct or agrees the receipt says what their choices are they can confirm and leave.

Does this sound like problem solved?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Only if voters were required to SIGN the receipt (paper backup), before placing it in the ballot box, would I agree.

[docpeter1953]

From the above article, "It''s not simply a question of whether these electronic machines are accurate and reliable, but also whether the voters perceive them as such. After all, many of these machines - at least initially - do not leave a paper trail."
_________________

Well how about printing a receipt for the voter. He/she could double check how their vote was tallied. If the receipt is printed and it doesn''t represent correctly the voter''s choices, then have two edit and confirm buttons seperated by a large distance, on the computer to allow for changes. If the receipt is correct then it can be placed in a box for the paper trail, but that shouldn''t be really necessary with the voter. After the voter has the opportunity to correct or agrees the receipt says what their choices are they can confirm and leave.

Does this sound like problem solved?