(CBS) The American public was led to believe that Saddam Hussein had large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and was prepared to use them, something which famously turned out not to be the case.

"One of the reasons people were told we were going to war in Iraq was because of the imminent attack with weapons of mass destruction was about to happen," Kroft observes.

When Feith replies, "I don't believe anybody in the U.S. government said that," Kroft begins to read to him from a statement by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld:

"No terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein."

Rumsfeld’s statement is followed with words from President Bush warning, "The Iraqi regime is a threat to any American," which, in turn, is followed by Vice President Cheney’s statement, "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies and against us."

Feith responds, "It is true that there was a serious error that the CIA made in saying that we would find WMD stockpiles. And it was a terrible mistake for the administration to have made those stockpiles in any way a part of the case for war. I don't think we needed to."

"Wasn't that the whole lynchpin for the war?" asks Kroft. “I don’t believe so,” the former Defense Department official answers.

Feith insists that Saddam still had WMD programs in place and the capability to resume production. He says even Rumsfeld conceded privately that the U.S. might not find any weapons of mass destruction on the ground. And he told the president so in a memo that outlined all of the things that could possibly go wrong.

Some call it, “the CYA Memo,” but Feith says that is a mischaracterization of the list. "I mean, it was very intense and very disturbing work to anticipate all the possible problems of a war."

Feith called the document "the Parade of Horribles," and printed many of them in his book, he says, to refute the perception that Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush launched the war without considering or understanding the possible consequences.

Kroft summarizes some of them, including the possibility that the U.S. could become so absorbed with its Iraq effort that it would pay inadequate attention to other serious problems; that war could cause more harm and entail greater costs than expected; that it would not go on for two to four years, but eight to 10 years; that terrorist networks could improve their recruiting and fundraising as a result of the U.S. being depicted as anti-Muslim; that Iraq could experience ethnic strife among Kurds, Sunnis and Shia and that the war could damage America’s relationship with allies and its reputation in the world community.

Kroft asks Feith if perhaps one or two of these “horribles,” might happen. Feith responds, "One of the things that is reflected in this memo is Secretary Rumsfeld's deeply-held view that it's foolish to try to predict the future," says Feith.

"Well, as it turned out, he was pretty good at anticipating problems” Kroft responds, “because virtually all these things have happened."

"Well, in a broad sense,” Feith concedes. “A lot of these things happened. It was a very honest effort to assess what the downsides of war would be."

When Kroft follows up with, "You still recommended that it was the right thing to do." Feith explains, "We certainly understood that these are the things that might happen. That's why we wrote them down. And I do think that, when the president assessed the risks of leaving Saddam in power, you could have come up with quite a serious, troubling list of the risks involved in leaving Saddam in power."

Produced by L. Franklin Devine and Michael Rosenbaum
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