America Can't Ignore Al Qaeda's Resurgence

Weekly Standard: U.S. Security Risked If We Underestimate Terror Group’s Core Leadership

(Weekly Standard)  This column was written by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi.

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Four years ago, his words would have represented an almost unquestioned consensus view. In late January, the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Dell Dailey, described al Qaeda's top leadership as isolated, saying that they have "much, much less central authority and much, much less capability to reach out."

He is not alone in this assessment. In July 2007, Stratfor's Peter Zeihan argued that while a few thousand people may claim to be al Qaeda members, "the real al Qaeda does not exercise any control over them. . . . The United States is now waging a war against jihadism as a phenomenon, rather than against any specific transnational jihadist movement." The most prominent proponent of this view has been Jason Burke, a reporter for London's Observer and the author of “Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam”. By the time that book hit newsstands in 2003, Burke was already arguing that the "nearest thing to 'Al-Qaeda,' as popularly understood," only existed for a five-year period, and the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001 showcased "the final scenes of its destruction." Now, Burke contends, we are "in a 'post-bin Laden' phase of Islamic militancy."

Unfortunately, all these men are wrong - and we will fight the war on terror less effectively if we continue to harbor mistaken assumptions about the al Qaeda network. It is important not to overstate what the terror group's leadership needs to do to remain relevant. Even if the central leadership's role is limited to connecting terrorist nodes - pairing skill sets, financing, and operatives - it can transform terrorist groups from disunited regional problems into cohesive adversaries capable of threatening Western societies. Moreover, the safe havens that al Qaeda's leaders have gained in recent years magnify their lethal capabilities.

Al Qaeda itself has faced internal debates about its future. Abu Musab al-Suri, one of the most prolific jihadist ideologues, in recent years has argued for a decentralized combat model. In contrast, Abu Bakr Naji, another prominent ideologue, calls for a more centralized model.

Suri's 1600-page manifesto, “The Call for Global Islamic Resistance”, argues that the centralized, hierarchical model of jihadism cannot overcome the U.S.'s technologically advanced military, and that regional security cooperation - such as the alliance between Washington and Islamabad - makes a hierarchical structure dangerous. He suggests that decentralization immunizes terror cells from detection through the capture and interrogation of members of other cells. Suri's prescription for decentralization would mean replacing the old training camp model with one in which fighters are trained "in homes and mobile camps."

In contrast, Naji's “The Management of Savagery” argues that once the jihadists hold territory, they should erect a governing apparatus to enforce Islamic law and provide security, food, and medical care. A high command would ensure that efforts are not needlessly duplicated, and would prioritize actions against various groups or nations. Naji's argument has carried the day within al Qaeda's hierarchy. Though there are many reasons for this, perhaps the most significant factor has been external events. As al Qaeda gained new safe havens in Pakistan and beyond, Naji's model seemed most fitting.

External events aside, the preference of al Qaeda's leadership for Naji's approach over Suri's reflects a long-standing inclination for centralization. Osama bin Laden originally formed al Qaeda to keep the vanguard of jihad alive after the Soviet Union's defeat in Afghanistan. West Point's Combating Terrorism Center has translated a number of documents captured during the Afghan and Iraq campaigns that the Department of Defense has declassified from its Harmony Database. These documents depict a clear al Qaeda hierarchy dating back to bin Laden's residence in Sudan between 1992 to 1996.

One document, entitled "Interior Organization," delineates al Qaeda's hierarchical structure, from the commander and ruling council down to organizational committees. It explains that the commander must have been a member of al Qaeda for at least seven years, have a sufficient understanding of Islamic law and jihad, and "have operational experience from jihad." The document also enumerates five separate committees: military, political, administrative and financial, security, and surveillance. Other documents detail members' duties, salaries, and even vacation time. Bachelors qualify for a round-trip ticket home after a year, although they have the option of using it for hajj (religious pilgrimage) instead. An application to train in al Qaeda camps inquires about the applicant's education level, professional experience, medical history, and how much of the Qur'an he has memorized.

Although the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan devastated al Qaeda's safe haven, the group's core leadership survived. A few - such as Saif al-Adl, Saad bin Laden, and Sulaiman Abu Ghaith - fled to Iran, but most relocated to Pakistan. Soon after, al Qaeda's regional nodes took the lead in operations. There were three such regional attacks in October 2002 alone. On October 8, 2002, two Kuwaitis linked to al Qaeda opened fire on U.S. marines, killing one. On October 12, Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyya killed 202 people in a nightclub bombing in Bali. On October 23, Chechen terrorists seized a Moscow theater packed with 850 people. The March 2003 capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, al Qaeda's principal operations commander and chief architect of the 9/11 attacks, set back the reassertion of al Qaeda's central leadership. Over the next year, regional attacks continued. We had grown so accustomed to attacks led by regional nodes that when the March 11, 2004, commuter train attacks in Madrid and the July 7, 2005, London suicide bombings were executed, they were immediately described as having little connection to al Qaeda's senior leaders.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that in this period analysts and media commentators underestimated the extent to which al Qaeda's central leadership remained able to organize terror attacks. Although a regional node implemented the Madrid plot, al Qaeda's senior leadership formulated the operation. The Center of Mujahideen Services, an internal al Qaeda "think tank," developed the political strategy behind the attack in the book “Iraq al-Jihad”, which concluded that "the Spanish government will not endure two or three attacks." The book thus argued that a coordinated terrorist assault could turn the Spanish public against the government, forcing it to withdraw troops from Iraq.

There were also operational connections between the Madrid cell and the broader al Qaeda network, but the connections were more dramatic for London's 7/7 attacks. British police reports were actually hesitant to link the 7/7 bombers to al Qaeda, describing the terror cell as autonomous and self-actuating. But as the official account of the 7/7 attacks hit the British press, terrorism analysts Dan Darling and Steve Schippert enumerated a number of problems with concluding so early that the broader al Qaeda network was largely irrelevant to the London plot. They noted connections between cell leader Mohammad Sidique Khan and Riduan Isamuddin, mastermind of the Bali bombings. Mohammed Junaid Babar, a Pakistani native living in Queens, New York, who pled guilty in federal court to smuggling military supplies to al Qaeda and assisting in a UK bombing plot, had identified Khan as someone he had met at an al Qaeda camp in Pakistan. Haroon Rashid Aswat, who helped set up an al Qaeda training camp in Oregon, had telephoned the London bombers hours before the attack. After the bombing, Khan and fellow bomber Shehzad Tanweer appeared in a video aired on the Arabic satellite channel al-Jazeera that included praise for the attacks from bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as Khan's suicide message. It is unlikely that al Qaeda's senior leadership would have this footage were they unconnected to the attack. Underscoring this point, al Jazeera aired a new video from Zawahiri on the first anniversary of the bombings claiming that Khan and Tanweer had visited an al Qaeda camp in Pakistan "seeking martyrdom." Bob Ayers, a security expert at London's Chatham House think tank, commented, "It makes the police look pretty bad. It means the investigation was either wrong, or they identified links but were reluctant to reveal them."

The connections between al Qaeda's senior leadership and the attacks in Madrid and London demonstrate that the group's top command was not as isolated and irrelevant during this period as some suggested. Still, it would gain more strength over time.

After relocating from Afghanistan to Pakistan, al Qaeda's senior leadership set about revamping its operations. They tried twice, in December 2003, to kill Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, leading him to send troops into Pakistan's tribal areas. Al Qaeda and allied tribes prevailed in the fight.

The 9/11 Commission concluded that to carry out catastrophic acts of terror, terrorist groups require sanctuaries that provide them with "time, space, and ability to perform competent planning and staff work" as well as "opportunities and space to recruit, train, and select operatives with the needed skills and dedication." Al Qaeda gained this in Pakistan with the signing of the South Waziristan accord, and later the North Waziristan accord, which signaled Musharraf's military defeat in the campaign directed at the tribal areas. The accords provided that Pakistan's military would not carry out air or ground strikes in the tribal areas, and included a pledge that Islamabad would disband its human intelligence network there. Three similar accords have since been signed: with the Bajaur region in March 2007, two months later with Swat, and finally with the Mohmand agency in August 2007. With these agreements in place, the United States has seen an influx of al Qaeda operatives and money into the tribal regions. Video taken in a Pakistani training camp last summer shows a graduation ceremony of about 300 recruits for suicide missions, some of whom are allegedly bound for the U.S. and Europe.

Compounding the problem of al Qaeda's Pakistan refuge, there are other areas where the group may gain further safe havens. One is Somalia, where most of the country was conquered by the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Courts Union in 2006. Though Ethiopian military intervention pushed that group back in 2007, the country now faces a potent Iraq-style insurgency spearheaded by extremist groups. And although the success of the U.S. troop surge over the past year has diminished the chances of an al Qaeda safe haven arising in Iraq, in the end that is a question of political will. If the next administration decides to quickly withdraw U.S. troops, that country could host additional safe havens.

Analysts declared al Qaeda’s central leadership defeated before it had been dealt a death blow. Its regional nodes and ambitious newcomers stepped to the fore while the group's senior leadership fought to gain control of territory - thus helping to reinforce the idea that the senior leadership was marginalized and irrelevant. Even at the time, the fallacy of this view should have been apparent: As Peter Bergen noted in a New Republic article about al Qaeda's resurgence, "the existence of Al-Qaeda imitators does not prove the obsolescence of the real thing." Now, as al Qaeda's vitality approaches pre-9/11 levels, many analysts still do not have their eye on the central network.

With a safe haven in Pakistan -- and perhaps soon in other territories - the senior leadership will likely play a greater role in future terror plots, while attempting to conceptualize and carry out an attack that will surpass 9/11. A strong central leadership makes the group more formidable and its attacks more deadly; dismissing the evidence that al Qaeda's leadership has regrouped will ultimately endanger U.S. security.

[it_oldtimer]

If the US wasn''t involved militarily in the Middle East, nobody would have ever even heard of Al Queda.

We have made them what they are today, and our actions alone are responsible for their growth as a credible cause.

[knyghtwolf]

Other than the daily tripe, drivel, and clap trap that comes from the mental midgets in Washedupington, todate there is still NO PHYSICAL PROOF that al Qaeda had anything to really do with 9/11, and since shrubbie the first has "forgotten" about osama Bin Laden, who or what are we fighting for? Seems to me, the shrub has his head up his or cheney''s rear fighting for air and deep breathing too many noxious vapours.

[Syndicate]

noloyalisti; nopot sure what you are talking about. I would agree that the military has killed a lot of people through out its entire history. But if you limit the analysis to the current conflict and only to innocent civilians then I have to disagree. Al queda kills Civilians by the hundreds weekly. The US military doesn''t. Bin ladens grievance is against american soldiers standing on "Holy ground". He thinks this gives him the right to terrorize people. They hate us not because of our freedom as bush says but because we stand in the way of a caliphate state stretching from the east atlantic to the west pacific. Anyone who stands in their way is expendable.

[noloyalisti]

Actually the US state sponsored terrorists (the military) has killed way more people than Al Quada.

We are the main cause of Islamic (and Christian) extremism both here and abroad.

We better wise up and start spreading the word about the GOP terrorists in our midst. That''s who we (and the rest of the world) need to fear.

[cbs_oliver]

Al Qaeda is a real movement centered in Afganistan and it is also a brand name applied by radical ideologs centered in the United States as a matter of convenience and propaganda to individuals and groups they wish to paint in the colors of a reviled enemy.

Both Al Qaeda in Afganistan and radical ideologs in America have deceit and murder and mayhem on their minds.

We need to hunt down Al Qaeda in Afganistan on the one hand and reject and disempower the radical ideologs in America on the other hand.

[clestes-2009]

OK guys, here is a good one for you.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0227/p99s04-duts.html

Army Chief of staff, Gen Casey says "We need more troops for Iraq and Afghanistan"

Gee, I thought the surge was working?? I thought victory was ours. Isn''t that what fossil McCain said about a month ago??

[clestes-2009]

to continue...

Instead, shrub allows himself to be seduced by dreams of military glory (something he had plenty of opportunity to have as a young man in Vietnam, but chose not to) and instead invaded Iraq, a country that had nothing to do with 9-11 and was never a danger to any country.
Because of that single stupid decision, Iran has risen to the height of power, Israel is weaker than ever, the US is weaker than ever, the US economy is tanking, our allies are no longer willing to help out on much of anything and our international reputation is in tatters.

al-quida knows perfectly well that the US military has reached the breaking point and is, in fact, breaking everyday. They have the time and patience to break the US down and that is exactly what they are doing.

The surge strategy was never going to be a success, and many of us fortold and I think we have seen the last of the good days. Iran and Afghanistan are going to get worse this year.

[clestes-2009]

to continue..

It would have been if that had been the REAL reason we were there. But it was not. When the call went out for an addition 4000 marines to block off the escape routes from Tora Bora, and it was turned down because Cheney decided that Pakistan military could do the job, (he was obviously ignorant of Pakistan''s history or he would have known better), Osama Bin Laden escaped that night.

Right then, it became apparent to all of the middle east and a few Americans that capturing OBL or destroying al-quida was NOT the priority. Had shrub had the sense to override Cheney, send in the 4000 marines and capture of kill OBL and then BACKED OUT. We would have been regarded as heros by Americans, respected by our allies and respected by the other middle east countries.

[clestes-2009]

Al-quida is NEVER, got that you righties, NEVER going to be defeated by US troops! I love ''em, they are the best, but they are not going to win this fight.

Al-quida is fighting for their way of life, their country, their religion. They, rightly I might add, see the US as invaders, occupiers, infidels and a country that wants to dominate them and take their oil, their women, their way of life away.

It is IMPOSSIBLE to win this kind of battle. We are on foreign soil, without justifiable reason for being there. Ah, you say, what about 9-11? Isn''t that justifiable??

[trillion1]

America can''t ignore? Try bush can''t ignore. This fool and the GOP did nothing to secure our borders. Have a backlog of thousands of documents and tapes because they won''t hire enought translators. And had to invade Iraq where there were no al qaede taking troops from Afganastan where there were. bush and his sheep are the best thing terrorists could hope for.

[mbcsmith]

LIBS just don''t get it. They bury their heads in the sand and hope it all goes away. Al-queda in Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan and Indonesia are thrilled the LIBS don''t want to recognize them or the threat they pose to the U.S.

[grumpas]

It would be nice if anyone could believe a word that comes out of these traitor''s mouths!!! But, unfortunately one can''t! Most of us are left to forming our own truth never being able to get an accurate account of what''s going on from the media. Because all they are is a mouth piece for Bush. Bush never fails to call Sunni and Shiite Insurgents Al Quida because it''s boosts his cause. When convenient they are all terrorist''s in his sick little mind. So who knows how involved AQ is in Iraq????? Most American''s are being left to their imaginations.

[bluestardad]

SPEAKING OF THE 911 COMMISSION, THEY ALSO SAID THAT CONDI RICES ACTIONS WERE INCOMPENT! BUT THIS WAS BURRIED AND NOT MADE PUBLIC!

DONT LET THIS ARTICLE WRITTEN BY DUEL PASSPORT HOLDING ISRAELI AMERICANS IMPACT YOUR DECISION TO THE FACT THAT THEY WANT TO KEEP AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE EAST!

THEY LIKE THE AID MONEY RUNNING THRU ISRAELI HELD BANKS AND COMPANIES!

SO EVERYTIME IT APPEARS THAT AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE GOING TO GET AN ELECTED OFFICIAL TO PULL AMERICA OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST THE ROVIAN PRODUCTION STUDIO IN CRAWFORT TEXAS PUTS OUT ANOTHER VIDEO OF SOME ALQAEDA PERSON AND THESE PRO ISRAELI ANTI AMERICAN RAGS START SPEWING THEIR PROPOGANDA!

THROW THE ISRAELI NEOCONS OUT OF AMERICAN POLITICS!

AMERICA STAND UP OR SHUT UP! TAKE BACK YOUR COUNTRY!

[mcvet]

Pakistani military operations in the (region) have not fundamentally damaged al Qaeda''s position.

AMAZING! These NEO NAZI''s called anyone who wanted to go after Al Queda and leave Iraq alone a "Surrender Monkey" and now that the REAL Enemy has completely rebuilt and we still bogged down in a stupid Civil War, they come forward and say?? WHO in the world is stupid enough to continue to follow these LOSERS!? They are flat getting the krap kicked out of them, have taken 6 years and a Trillion dollars to do it but some what to just "Stay the Course"? THAT''s INSANE!! Sieg Heil Bush

[knyghtwolf]

Wonder how Olivia, Elliot, and the rest of the Law & Order SVU would handle the Rape and Murder of the United States? Imagine Munch questioning al Qaeda''s top leadership? I think shrubbie & lil dikk have tried to turn this whole thing into a faith-based sitcom soap opera/drama MTV reality based SciFi weekly special, just MY personal opinion is all.

[vet_sk]

Just about everyday we wake up and notice the opinion article listed here at CBS...and you know it is the Weekly Standard. We always have to remember they were some big cheerleaders in getting us into Iraq.

[jesterbelle]

Really?Maybe if the puppet hadn''''t wasted our time and resources on the lame duck in Iraq...

[magoo2u1]

We faced the threat from behind the iron curtain and the bamboo curtain without giving away the constitution.

[incog-nito]

Hmmm... Wonder how AQ got to be resurgent in the first place. Aren''t we supposed to be "winning"?

[inventagod]

Bu$hCo NeoCons did 9/11 and blamed it all on alQaeda.

Just embrace the truth and move on. It was the precursor to the fake Iraq invasion, and you all bought it, hook, line and sinker.
444 days before the USA investigated the atrocity!
Shame.......