Iran Nuke Q & A

CBS News Correspondent Sheila MacVicar Explains Reaction To Iran

(CBS)  What’s the evidence they were/are working on a weapon?

For the first time, an IAEA document makes clear there is a link between Iran’s nuclear energy work, and work on a weapons design.

As recently as 2003, international sources say Iran conducted experimental explosions of a "type that could also be used to prepare for future nuclear weapons tests."

A U.S. intelligence agency obtained a laptop from an Iranian defector which included theoretical work on a missile warhead which would explode in the air above a target. Analysts say such a device would be useful only with the nuclear warhead.

The IAEA says it has found what it called "administrative interconnections" between uranium enrichment programs, the high explosives testing and the warhead work.

CBS News has learned "administrative interconnections" means organizations either part of, or linked to, Iran’s military, which should play no part in a peaceful program.

Diplomatic sources tell CBS News that all U.S. intelligence agencies, and more importantly perhaps, those of European countries which are not allied with the US over Iraq, agree that Iran has a covert weapons program.


If the IAEA inspectors think Iran is up to no good, why should they have access to nuclear technology at all?

It’s a long story, which goes back to a simpler time. The international community agreed nuclear weapons were a bad thing, and to limit their spread, and to persuade those, like the U.S., which already had them, to disarm, they came up with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The idea was that using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, like power generation was good. But because the processes used to produce fuel for electricity generation or a nuclear warhead are essentially the same, nations were asked to sign the Treaty, saying they’d behave.

The problem is the Treaty trusts nations to declare what they are really up to, and asks inspectors to make sure they’re not cheating on what they say they’ve got.

Iran signed the NPT, and ratified it, in 1970, under the era of the Shah. He had plans to construct 20 nuclear power stations. They were never built, but by the 1990’s the Iranians again were openly interested in nuclear energy and signed a deal with Russia to build a power plant. (Under current NPT rules, having a power plant permits you to master the enrichment technology.)


What is the IAEA anyway? Why can’t they do more?

The International Atomic Energy Agency administers the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It’s a creature of its 139 members. Its roots lie in a speech from President Eisenhower, who envisaged the creation of an international body to control and develop the peaceful use of atomic energy (Eisenhowers’ "Atoms for Peace" speech).

Dealing with countries like Iran (and recently, Iraq and Libya) requires robust investigation. The member states have not given IAEA inspectors that power (with the exception of the weapons inspections carried out in Iraq). As it is, they require at least some co-operation from Iran to be able to carry out what can be described as "nuclear forensics." It was never meant to be a nuclear FBI.


Iran says it's co-operating. What's the problem?

The co-operation is incomplete. We’ve already talked about the one page the Iranians have handed over regarding the contact with the Khan rogue network in 1987.

The Iranians have prevented, or limited access to some sites. In late Jan., 2006 IAEA inspectors were finally permitted to visit a site called Lavizan, near Tehran. It was a military installation, razed to the ground after opposition groups alleged it was being used in the nuclear program. Most important for the inspectors, they wanted access to the equipment that had been at Lavizan, and to talk to the scientist who ran the facility (the IAEA knows who he is). They were shown some of the equipment, but prohibited from meeting the scientist, on the grounds that he "is in the military." (And that alone is not reassuring).


How do we get out of this mess?

First, diplomats are very keen to emphasize that military action is not an option (though Israeli generals have made worrying noises. Iran has many facilities, and perhaps, many more concealed facilities).

Action by the Security Council would probably take the form of sanctions, but there is no agreement on what kind of sanctions, or how effective they would be.

European Union states had tried to negotiate with Iran, offering a "non-nuclear technology transfer" if the Iranians gave up on uranium enrichment. But non-EU sources familiar with what was on the table said the package was not attractive enough, and did not, for example, include access to new airplanes or rail technology.

The best bet would seem to be continuing diplomacy (the U.S. is of the view that Iran has become more co-operative only after pressure has been applied), especially through the Russians.

Russia has put a proposal on the table where it would enrich uranium for power plant use in Iran in its own, existing enrichment facilities. Iran would use the fuel under international safeguards, and return the spent rods to Russia for re-processing.

The Iranians insist they want to exercise their right to mastery of enrichment technology, and even if they agree to the Russian arrangement, want to continue to run an research and development line.


That sounds reasonable. What’s wrong with that?

Given Iran’s history of concealment, and lack of confidence in its’ motives, the fear is the Iranians could happily run nuclear power reactors with Russian fuel while mastering enrichment technology. And then at some point in the future, announce, like North Korea, that they are abrogating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, putting an end to any IAEA oversight. Having mastered the technology, it might then take just months to accumulate enough weapons-grade enriched uranium to make a bomb.


How far is Iran from the bomb, and who else should I be worried about?

U.S. intelligence estimates that if Iran went full speed on a weapons program, AND was able to overcome its considerable technical difficulties (there have been problems with various stages of the enrichment process and most of the technology they are believed to have access to is old), they could have a nuclear weapon perhaps by the end of this decade. Other analyses suggest it could take up to ten years.

Meanwhile, if you’re not worried yet, here are some others who are believed to be in the nuclear market: Saudi Arabia, Brazil, South Africa. Libya has abandoned its program. North Korea is believed to either have, or be close to a weapon, but it is outside all international safeguards, as is Israel which probably has an arsenal of nuclear weapons. The declared nuclear powers are the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India and Pakistan.