Comments on: Al Qaeda's New Face Of Terror: American?

Top Counter-Terrorism Official At FBI Tells CBS News Next Attack On U.S. Could Be Carried Out By Americans

[manms0808]

you know ... this is really getting sickening...we know what they are trying to do now...and that is to actually say Alqueda is americans NOW.... these people making this *** up... MAKE ME SICK

[hillaryin08]

al Qaeda should set up a recruiting booth at the DNC convention.

[dsr57]

Wonderful Just Effing wonderful.... I''m going to start shooting people for making sudden moves now

[taotxzen1]

Army Buried Study Faulting Iraq Planning

Published on Monday, February 11, 2008 by The New York Times

by Michael R. Gordon

WASHINGTON - The Army is accustomed to protecting classified information. But when it comes to the planning for the Iraq war, even an unclassified assessment can acquire the status of a state secret.0211 01

That is what happened to a detailed study of the planning for postwar Iraq prepared for the Army by the RAND Corporation, a federally financed center that conducts research for the military.

After 18 months of research, RAND submitted a report in the summer of 2005 called %u201CRebuilding Iraq.%u201D RAND researchers provided an unclassified version of the report along with a secret one, hoping that its publication would contribute to the public debate on how to prepare for future conflicts.

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But the study%u2019s wide-ranging critique of the White House, the Defense Department and other government agencies was a concern for Army generals, and the Army has sought to keep the report under lock and key.

A review of the lengthy report - a draft of which was obtained by The New York Times - shows that it identified problems with nearly every organization that had a role in planning the war. That assessment parallels the verdicts of numerous former officials and independent analysts.

The study chided President Bush - and by implication Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who served as national security adviser when the war was planned - as having failed to resolve differences among rival agencies. %u201CThroughout the planning process, tensions between the Defense Department and the State Department were never mediated by the president or his staff,%u201D it said.

The Defense Department led by Donald H. Rumsfeld was given the lead in overseeing the postwar period in Iraq despite its %u201Clack of capacity for civilian reconstruction planning and execution.%u201D

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The State Department led by Colin L. Powell produced a voluminous study on the future of Iraq that identified important issues but was of %u201Cuneven quality%u201D and %u201Cdid not constitute an actionable plan.%u201D

Gen. Tommy R. Franks, whose Central Command oversaw the military operation in Iraq, had a %u201Cfundamental misunderstanding%u201D of what the military needed to do to secure postwar Iraq, the study said.

A team of RAND researchers led by Nora Bensahel interviewed more than 50 civilian and military officials. As it became clear that decisions made by civilian officials had contributed to the Army%u2019s difficulties in Iraq, researchers delved into those policies as well.

The report was submitted at a time when the Bush administration was trying to rebut building criticism of the war in Iraq by stressing the progress Mr. Bush said was being made. The approach culminated in his announcement in November 2005 of his %u201CNational Strategy for Victory in Iraq.%u201D

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[taotxzen1]

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One serious problem the study described was the Bush administration%u2019s assumption that the reconstruction requirements would be minimal. There was also little incentive to challenge that assumption, the report said.

%u201CBuilding public support for any pre-emptive or preventative war is inherently challenging, since by definition, action is being taken before the threat has fully manifested itself,%u201D it said. %u201CAny serious discussion of the costs and challenges of reconstruction might undermine efforts to build that support.%u201D

Another problem described was a general lack of coordination. %u201CThere was never an attempt to develop a single national plan that integrated humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, governance, infrastructure development and postwar security,%u201D the study said.

One result was that %u201Cthe U.S. government did not provide strategic policy guidance for postwar Iraq until shortly before major combat operations commenced.%u201D The study said that problem was compounded by General Franks, saying he took a narrow view of the military%u2019s responsibilities after Saddam Hussein was ousted and assumed that American civilian agencies would do much to rebuild the country.

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[taotxzen1]

(cont)

General Franks%u2019s command, the study asserted, also assumed that Iraq%u2019s police and civil bureaucracy would stay on the job and had no fallback option in case that expectation proved wrong. When Baghdad fell, the study said, American forces there %u201Cwere largely mechanized or armored forces, well suited to waging major battles but not to restoring civil order. That task would have been better carried out, ideally, by military police or, acceptably, by light infantry trained in urban combat.%u201D

A %u201Cshortfall%u201D in American troops was exacerbated when General Franks and Mr. Rumsfeld decided to stop the deployment of the Army%u2019s First Cavalry Division when other American forces entered Baghdad, the study said, a move that reflected their assessment that the war had been won. Problems persisted during the occupation. In the months that followed, the report said, there were %u201Csignificant tensions, most commonly between the civilian and military arms of the occupation.%u201D

The poor planning had %u201Cthe inadvertent effort of strengthening the insurgency,%u201D as Iraqis experienced a lack of security and essential services and focused on %u201Cnegative effects of the U.S. security presence.%u201D The American military%u2019s inability to seal Iraq%u2019s borders, a task the 2005 report warned was still not a priority, enabled foreign support for the insurgents to flow into Iraq.

[nonameabc]

Oh... hoohooho... I am very scary and afraid... Mr. President please help us ... and safe our axx.

[underdogus]

Sheeesh, screeching fear monger....you don''''t even live in Reality.
Posted by FloydZepp....FloydTwilightZoneZepp....