Google+ a failure as a platform?
"Google+ is a prime example of our complete failure to understand platforms from the very highest levels of executive leadership," wrote Google engineer Steve Yegge on his Google+ page.
His basic message: Google doesn't know a thing about platforms and that fact threatens its existence given that Apple, Amazon, Microsoft and Facebook understand them.
Yegge, hopefully won't be fired for posting a rant six years in the making on Google+. In fact, he may have just opened enough eyes to make Google more competitive. Yegge's post reminds me of Brad Garlinghouse's Peanut Butter Manifesto at Yahoo. That manifesto didn't work out so well. Yahoo is still spread thin, still a mess and Garlinghouse works at AOL now.
Yegge has so many money quotes in his memo, which was shared to the world because "I am not what you might call an experienced Google+ user." There goes Yegge's bonus. Yegge deleted the memo, but Silicon Angle preserved it for the record.
The biggest thing in Yegge's memo is that he argues that Google doesn't get platforms. He wrote:
Google+ is a prime example of our complete failure to understand platforms from the very highest levels of executive leadership (hi Larry, Sergey, Eric, Vic, howdy howdy) down to the very lowest leaf workers (hey yo). We all don't get it. The Golden Rule of platforms is that you Eat Your Own Dogfood. The Google+ platform is a pathetic afterthought. We had no API at all at launch, and last I checked, we had one measly API call. One of the team members marched in and told me about it when they launched, and I asked: "So is it the Stalker API?" She got all glum and said "Yeah." I mean, I was joking, but no... the only API call we offer is to get someone's stream. So I guess the joke was on me....
Google+ is a knee-jerk reaction, a study in short-term thinking, predicated on the incorrect notion that Facebook is successful because they built a great product. But that's not why they are successful. Facebook is successful because they built an entire constellation of products by allowing other people to do the work. So Facebook is different for everyone. Some people spend all their time on Mafia Wars. Some spend all their time on Farmville. There are hundreds or maybe thousands of different high-quality time sinks available, so there's something there for everyone.
Our Google+ team took a look at the aftermarket and said: "Gosh, it looks like we need some games. Let's go contract someone to, um, write some games for us." Do you begin to see how incredibly wrong that thinking is now? The problem is that we are trying to predict what people want and deliver it for them.
You can't do that. Not really. Not reliably. There have been precious few people in the world, over the entire history of computing, who have been able to do it reliably. Steve Jobs was one of them. We don't have a Steve Jobs here. I'm sorry, but we don't.
Yegge then goes on to compare Google's platform strategy with Amazon, Apple, Microsoft and Facebook.
He picks up the rant:
After you've marveled at the platform offerings of Microsoft and Amazon, and Facebook I guess (I didn't look because I didn't want to get too depressed), head over to developers.google.com and browse a little. Pretty big difference, eh? It's like what your fifth-grade nephew might mock up if he were doing an assignment to demonstrate what a big powerful platform company might be building if all they had, resource-wise, was one fifth grader.
Please don't get me wrong here -- I know for a fact that the dev-rel team has had to FIGHT to get even this much available externally. They're kicking ass as far as I'm concerned, because they DO get platforms, and they are struggling heroically to try to create one in an environment that is at best platform-apathetic, and at worst often openly hostile to the idea.
I'm just frankly describing what developers.google.com looks like to an outsider. It looks childish.
Now the big question is where Google goes from here.
The problem we face is pretty huge, because it will take a dramatic cultural change in order for us to start catching up. We don't do internal service-oriented platforms, and we just as equally don't do external ones. This means that the "not getting it" is endemic across the company: the PMs don't get it, the engineers don't get it, the product teams don't get it, nobody gets it. Even if individuals do, even if YOU do, it doesn't matter one bit unless we're treating it as an all-hands-on-deck emergency. We can't keep launching products and pretending we'll turn them into magical beautiful extensible platforms later. We've tried that and it's not working.
The Golden Rule of Platforms, "Eat Your Own Dogfood", can be rephrased as "Start with a Platform, and Then Use it for Everything." You can't just bolt it on later. Certainly not easily at any rate -- ask anyone who worked on platformizing MS Office. Or anyone who worked on platformizing Amazon. If you delay it, it'll be ten times as much work as just doing it correctly up front. You can't cheat. You can't have secret back doors for internal apps to get special priority access, not for ANY reason. You need to solve the hard problems up front.
I'm not saying it's too late for us, but the longer we wait, the closer we get to being Too Late.
Where does Google go from here? Google can become more platform-oriented. It can laugh off--or fire Yegge. Or it can change. It's Google's call. Stay tuned.
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