Pentagon disputes coverage of Africa presence

At the time of the military seizure on March 22, U.S. Africa Command had a small number of personnel in Mali who were supporting our military-to-military activities. Military assistance to Mali was suspended immediately following the seizure. U.S. government personnel from many agencies, including DoD, remained on stand-by in Bamako as negotiations continued toward a return to democratic, constitutional, civilian rule. Because of the continued uncertainty surrounding the outcome and consequences of the seizure, and the fact that military engagement had only been suspended, our personnel remained in Mali to provide assistance to the Embassy, maintain situational awareness on the unfolding events, and assist in coordination between U.S. Africa Command and the Embassy.

The U.S. State Department terminated foreign assistance to the government of Mali on April 10. The Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency received a memorandum from the State Department dated 19 April notifying the DoD of the coup designation and the termination of all military assistance programs. Upon receiving this notification from State Department, we began arranging the departure of personnel and equipment from Mali. All U.S. military personnel who were in Mali supporting military-to-military engagement activities have since departed Mali. Only those Department of Defense personnel regularly assigned to the Embassy (such as the Defense Attache or U.S. Marine Corps guards) remain.

Also, the introduction to the story states it was recently "revealed" that three U.S. soldiers were killed in an accident in Mali in April and that "This is how we know that U.S. special operations forces were operating in chaotic, previously democratic Mali." The fact is we issued a press release a day after the soldiers were killed, and the Associated Press, Xinhua, and AFP ran stories on the incident. It must be noted that the activities of U.S. military forces in Mali have been very public. We have published stories, fact sheets, and photos on our website, and Malian, U.S. and international reporters have covered these activities for some years.

"Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces are engaged in missions against the Lord's Resistance Army": While our forces live and work closely with African security forces, our focus is on enabling their ability to better conduct command and control, planning and coordination. Special Operations Forces are not directly involved in the African-led operation to remove the threat of the LRA. The mission for U.S. forces in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan is to advise and assist local forces to better enable them to conduct their operations. As a matter of fact, in April 2012, we organized a four-day press event in Uganda and CAR, providing 18 local and international journalists' access to cover the African-led counter-LRA mission. This visit resulted in extensive worldwide coverage of the story, which clearly articulated our advise and assist mission.

"And that's still just a part of the story": Yes, we've trained Ugandan, Burundian, and Djiboutian troops supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As part of the C-LRA media trip mentioned above, we also brought the media to visit the AMISOM train-up efforts -- all taking place at a Uganda People's Defense Force base outside Kampala, Uganda. This visit also resulted in extensive worldwide media coverage. We've also trained Senegalese and Rwandan troops supporting the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), as well as peacekeepers from nearly a dozen other African countries. We apply the resources that we do have to help countries willing to contribute to multinational efforts like AMISOM or UNAMID so that they can continue their operations. Our engagement in this realm is in support of a State Department-led peacekeeping training program, which has trained more than 200,000 African peacekeepers from 25 African nations over the years. Recently we've seen positive results in Mogadishu, not only as a result of the U.S. support, but more importantly, because of the brave men and women of the AMISOM troop-contributing nations.

Like every Geographic Combatant Command, we have an exercise program with nations within our area of responsibility. We currently have 14 major bilateral and multilateral exercises that have been conducted or are planned for 2012 and as many in 2013. As you probably know, many security issues in Africa are best addressed multilaterally. Exercises are a critical engagement opportunity that not only allow for improvements to interoperability, but also foster greater regional cooperation and integration.

We also conduct some type of military training or military-to-military engagement or activity with nearly every country on the African continent. This is part of our effort to enable African nations to increase their defense capabilities. These activities are requested by the host nation and cleared by the U.S. embassies. Many are well covered by local press and highlighted on our website.

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3/8

[BWB2020]

Usual bagger tactics from the CIA, obfuscate, play semantics games, and attempt to redefine language in order to avoid responsibility for their actions.

Bottom line, there is absolutely no threat in Africa that meets the "clear and present danger" threshold for American military to be there at all, let alone establishing a long-term military presence there.

Anyone thinking that the US is there only for the short term is a pure sucker of the lowest order.

There is only one reason that US soldiers are in Africa, to kill people considered a hindrance to the US and multinational corporations seeking to steal the natural resources, without fair compensation to the people living where such resources are located.

I would chalk it up to simple greed if some of the posters defending the CIA's occupation of Africa actually own stock in, work for, or otherwise receive money from the multinationals who are using the CIA as a free mercenary service, on the taxpayer dime.

But what I cannot understand are the suckers who will not only receive absolutely nothing from this hostile and illegal meddling in the affairs of other sovereign states, but who will actually have their taxpayer dollars wasted in this debacle.

I find the Kony situation, for example, hypocritical to the point of hilarity.

We have baggers, who have consistently demonstrated their hatred for the "black" people in their own country, yet trying to justify the elimination of someone they say is doing great harm to the people they hate anyway.

They should be cheering Kony, for allegedly doing, in part, that which most baggers would like to do to all "black" people.

As for the president, no matter who that is, or will be, the CIA can and would assassinate that president if they deemed him to be a threat to their fiefdom, they are more powerful and more deadly than the president.

Had JFK survived, he probably would have agreed with that assertion.

[yetanotherwill]

5000 troops engaged in routine military-to-military diplomacy out of 1.5 million uniformed service members. 54 nations, a billion people, many minerals among the natural resources. Long term growth of Islam inc. the extremist varieties. This is really only an issue for someone as naive as Turse to think that direct military-to-military relationships are not how diplomacy gets done.

[ticobird]

Thank you pdchapin for a well stated reply as to the veracity of Turse's article. I felt exactly the same way while reading it.

[pdchapin]

I was very impressed with the thoughtfulness of this discussion by both side. However, I found Turse's response less than satisfactory. I was struck by his comment, "Whether you call that an "outpost," a "base," or a "camp" matters little." It matters a lot of difference. As a reporter his task is to leave his readers with an accurate impression of what's going on. To the typical reader "base" implies a large, permanent or semi-permanent operation. To say that there is one base and a dozen outposts leaves a radically different impression that to say there are 13 bases. And the evidence that was provided, and which he doesn't dispute, indicates that the impression left by his writing is simply wrong. This pattern is repeated over and over again as he slectively uses words in ways that don't match normal interpretation. A reporter shouldn't have to run to the dictionary to defend his choice of words. His general defense, that the counter argument generally agrees with him could more accurately be interpreted as conceding that the objections are largely correct.

[sdsSteve]

I had the exact opposite reaction. To the typical reader, like me, "base" implies any and all bases of operation regardless of size. A thousand small bases can easily equate to a single large base in many ways. Simple common sense. Perhaps not military lingo but I'm not in the military. I didn't see a reporter 'running' to the dictionary to "defend" his choice of words but simply pointing out the common man's widely held concept of the word "base" and backing it up with facts like a good reporter is supposed to do. His general defense, that the counter argument generally agrees with him, rings completely true to me.