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Stuxnet: Computer worm opens new era of warfare
Langner: We knew at this time that the highest number of infections had been reported in Iran. And second, it was pretty clear, just by looking at the sophistication, that there would be at least one nation state behind this. You know, you just add one and one together.
By the fall of 2010, the consensus was that Iran's top secret uranium enrichment plant at Natanz was the target and that Stuxnet was a carefully constructed weapon designed to be carried into the plant on a corrupted laptop or thumb drive, then infect the system, disguise its presence, move through the network, changing computer code and subtly alter the speed of the centrifuges without the Iranians ever noticing. Sabotage by software.
O Murchu: Stuxnet's entire purpose is to control centrifuges. To make centrifuges speed up past what they're meant to spin at and to damage them. Certainly it would damage the uranium enrichment facility and they would need to be replaced.
Kroft: If the centrifuges were spinning too fast, wouldn't the operators at the plant know that?
O Murchu: Stuxnet was able to prevent the operators from seeing that on their screen. The operators would look at the screen to see what's happening with centrifuges and they wouldn't see that anything bad was happening.
It now seems likely that by the time O Murchu and Langner finally unraveled the mystery in November of 2010, Stuxnet had already accomplished at least part of its mission. Months before the virus was first detected, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency had begun to notice that Iran was having serious problems with its centrifuges at Natanz.
O Murchu: What we know is that an IAEA report said that 1,000 to 2,000 centrifuges were removed from Natanz for unknown reasons. And we know that Stuxnet targets 1,000 centrifuges. So from that, people are drawn to the conclusion well Stuxnet got in and succeeded. That's the only evidence that we have.
Kroft: The only information that's not classified?
O Murchu: Yes.
And there are lots of things about Stuxnet that are still top secret.
Kroft: Who was behind it?
O Murchu: What we do know is that this was a very large operation. You're really looking at a government agency from some country who is politically motivated and who has the insider information from a uranium enrichment facility that would facilitate building a threat like this.
Kroft: An intelligence agency probably?
O Murchu: Probably.
Langner: We know from reverse engineering the attack codes that the attackers have full, and I mean this literally, full tactical knowledge of every damn detail of this plant. So you could say in a way they know the plant better than the Iranian operator.
We wanted to know what Retired General Michael Hayden had to say about all this since he was the CIA director at the time Stuxnet would have been developed.
Kroft: You left the CIA in 2009?
Hayden: 2009. Right.
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